THE MISSIONARY THEME IN THE RHETORIC OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Statement of Problem

The political analyst and the rhetorical critic ultimately share the problem of distinguishing between what a man says and what he does. Cultures give rise to rhetorics and rhetorics are used to justify political actions. Rhetorics become conventions and methods of justification can characterize historical periods. "There is no middle ground between freedom and slavery," John Foster Dulles once said.[1] From a rhetorical point of view, the words might have been spoken from the left or the right. John F. Kennedy could have uttered the convention or Barry Goldwater or Adlai Stevenson. Rhetorically, the statement is a platitude, one that Westerners have long expected from their leaders, one to which all political shades of difference could nod their heads in consent. Politically, the statement is unrealistic. There <u>is</u> a middle ground between freedom and slavery, namely the status quo that exists in varying degrees in all nations, including the Western democracies. Yet both the political analyst and the rhetorical critic will concede the statement to their orators as a type of poetic license, understanding correctly that leaders must respond to climates of opinion.

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[1]John Foster Dulles, "Report on Berlin," <u>Department of State Bulletin</u>, March 8, 1954, p. 343.

However, there is the real danger of conceding too much to the orator. Where does response to popular demand end and where does the speaker's real belief begin? It is precisely because men must respond to climates of opinion that scholars must go beyond the rhetorical act and the uttered method of justification to find the real motive or basis of action for what a man does. Theodore Draper did this in his study of the Dominican Crisis[2] and uncovered a vast difference between the spoken rhetoric of justification and real motives of the State Department.

There are, in fact, two types of political rhetoric: One aims at persuasion, the other articulates ideology. The orator who aims at persuasion attempts to convince an audience of his correct position through the use of strategies, attempting to find a common ground between an audience and the speaker's desires. For example, the advocate who desires to become president will survey the political, social, educational and economic conditions of the nation and groups within the nation and adjust his arguments to the beliefs of his audience. When campaigning in the South, his arguments will differ from those he uses when he is campaigning in the North. When addressing labor, his focus will differ from when he is addressing management. When addressing the young, he will concentrate on certain sets of arguments that he will not use when addressing the old. Thus the phrase "mere rhetoric" emerges as if to indicate that the speaker is not to be taken seriously

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[2]Theodore Draper, "The Dominican Crisis," Commentary, December 1965, pp. 33-68.

but is rather engaging in "campaign oratory." This is viewed as a necessary evil, it raises few eyebrows and is an accepted and expected part of the American political tradition. All orators engage in "mere rhetoric," some more so than others; indeed, the American two-party system could not survive without an orator's attempting to adjust his rhetoric to a wide section of national opinion.

The other kind of political rhetoric, though rarer, is nonetheless present. This political orator believes so strongly in his ideology that he cannot always adjust his arguments to suit the needs of particular people. Indeed, he often ignores his audience and presents instead his own ideology. It remains largely the same from audience to audience. Barry Goldwater was and is probably our most ideological contemporary orator. His message was largely the same to all audiences during his 1964 presidential campaign and explains, in part, his failure to gather strong support from large groups whose ideology differed from his own.

While it may be granted that all speakers engage in both types of rhetoric, one can still imagine a sort of continuum. On one side is the speaker who will use any argument that will achieve his goal. His rhetoric is totally malleable, flexible and adaptable to any situation, any audience and any belief. On the other side of the continuum is the strictly ideological orator; his rhetoric is rigid, inflexible and non-changing. This orator has no price, so to speak, and sees no room for compromise in any situation involving his ideology.

Probably no speaker falls at either extreme of the continuum. The majority of speakers would no doubt fall close to the center. But

admitting this does not harm the utility of our continuum. There is, after all, a difference between Richard Nixon and Adlai Stevenson; James Buchanan and Robert Ingersoll; Lyndon Johnson and Wayne Morse. The utility of the continuum is that, once the speaker's place is found, we have determined his rhetorical posture.

This study will examine the rhetorical posture of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State; that is, his world-view, his frame of reference, those beliefs that created an ethos from which his statements and actions can be better explained and more clearly understood. The establishment of such a posture is crucial to the understanding of the Eisenhower years and all that those years unfolded: the crises between East and West, the atomic stalemate, the stirrings in Asia and Africa, the building of mutual security pacts, the new emphasis on international economics and the decline of the Atlantic Alliance.

Such a study is crucial to the understanding of the new vocabulary that characterized the Fifties: rollback, liberation, neutrality, agonizing reappraisal, brinkmanship, bipartisanship and massive retaliation. It was, afterall, Dulles and not Eisenhower who was the American protagonist of the Fifties and we need to examine the commonly held verdict articulated by John Robinson Beal that Dulles was "one man who was never deceived about the nature of the Soviet menace."[3] Specifically this study will attempt to answer three questions: First, was there a constant and consistent theme that permeated the rhetoric of John Foster Dulles? Secondly, to what extent did his rhetoric influence his political

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[3]John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles: A Biography (New York, 1957), p. xiii.

acts? Thirdly, did his rhetorical posture create an inflexible political posture?

B. Uniqueness of Dulles

It may be said at once that the peculiar rhetoric that characterized the tenure of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State finds its roots in the man himself and not the office he held. In a very real sense, Dulles was an exception to those tenets that governed his predecessors in the State Department.

Norman A. Graebner, who found the tradition of Secretary of State an uncertain one, questions the degree of autonomy that a Secretary of State can possess under the American political system:

> It is questionable, however, whether the convictions of the Secretary of State are the key determinants in the creation of policy, for between his conception of what policy should be and the nation's actual behavior abroad are such modifying factors as the Secretary's relationship to the President, the attitude of Congress, the voices of the press, advisers inside and outside the State Department, and the various pressure groups that represent the public itself. It is seldom clear what elements in the American democratic process determine the character of specific foreign policy decisions.[4]

While it is true that a variety of factors influence the positions that a Secretary of State might outline, these factors were minimized with Dulles probably more than with any other Secretary of State in the twentieth century. This is true for two intermingling reasons and each must be examined. First, there existed in the America of the Fifties a

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[4]Norman A. Graebner, An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1961), p. vi.

largely unprecedented confidence in the President. Secondly, Dulles served this popular, though inexperienced, President who was most content to leave foreign affairs to his trusted Secretary. With only a few exceptions, Dulles operated relatively freely.

C. National Harmony

There was a large degree of national harmony present during the Eisenhower years. Though Dulles benefited from Eisenhower's personal popularity, his own reputation as the chief Republican spokesman on foreign policy contributed to this harmony.

Richard Rovere writes of the unity that existed during Eisenhower's first term of office:

> It is a decade at least since there has been anything approaching the present degree of national unity. It has been asserted here that neither Franklin Roosevelt during the war nor Harry Truman back in the days when every American was a Truman rooter had the kind of support that President Eisenhower has now. Whether this is so or not, the President is--for the time being, anyway--as free as a bird. At Geneva he can take any course that appears to him to be sensible. He can raise or lower the price of American consent to a settlement according to his own best judgment of what the price ought to be. All the power and prestige of the United States will be at his disposal, and although he must act in the knowledge that there will be a political reckoning late next year, he can be confident that anything he does at Geneva will now be accepted by the people and, if it should come to that, ratified by the Senate.[5]

Several years earlier, when Dulles was appointed Secretary, Rovere wrote that: "The incoming Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, is a breathing, talking symbol of party unity. He commands the respect of both the Taft

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[5]Richard Rovere, Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years (New York, 1956), p. 269-270.

and Dewey wings and is perhaps the only man alive who does so."[6]

Additionally, Richard Goold-Adams suggests that Dulles contributed more to Republicanism than simple unity:

> History may well judge that his greatest achievement was that he eased the Republican Party through into the twentieth century; that he helped them to face up to the international realities of the modern world, so that American power might continuously sustain the West with the kind of leadership which, in the nature of things, could come from nowhere else.[7]

Thus American opinion and Republican politics allowed the administration a large amount of latitude in conducting foreign affairs. This is not to suggest that the period was without its critics; they were several and constant, but their voices were clearly unheard in both the confidence and apathy that Americans displayed for their leaders in the decade of the Fifties.

D. Eisenhower's Confidence

The same degree of confidence that the nation displayed for Eisenhower, the President shared with Dulles. Andrew Berding suggests that "no Secretary of State has been more warmly and unfailingly backed by the President he served."[8] This was true because:

> . . . President Eisenhower had an abiding faith in his Secretary of State's capacity to handle any foreign relations problem. He recognized the Secretary's great power of intellect and will, his vast knowledge of and experience in foreign relations, and his

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[6] Ibid., p. 65.

[7] Richard Goold-Adams, The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles (London, 1962), p. 295.

[8] Andrew H. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (Princeton, 1965), p. 1.

> willingness to work without cease to strengthen and unify the free world nations in the struggle against communist imperialism. He was prepared to let his Secretary of State take the iniative in relations with other countries and to be considered the United States spokesman on foreign policy.[9]

Hans Morgenthau, more often than not a critic of Dulles, gives the same reluctant conclusion:

> When Dulles spoke in the councils of the government, he spoke not only as the President's principal adviser on foreign affairs, as would any Secretary of State, but also and patently as the President's alter ego. When Dulles spoke, it was for all practical purposes the President of the United States who spoke. The voice of so trusted and admired a servant was not challenged lightly. This relationship between the President and his Secretary of State made it impossible from the outset for any executive department to bypass the Secretary of State by gaining the ear of the President and to pursue a foreign policy of his own in competition with that of the Secretary of State.[10]

Eisenhower relates in his memoirs that before the appointment "he and I had held a number of conversations on the international outlook and found ourselves in substantial agreement in our conclusions. He was a vigorous Republican who had represented bipartisanship in earlier years, a man of strong opinions and unimpeachable character."[11]

Finally, Sherman Adams notes that

> Eisenhower gave Dulles a free hand and wide responsibility in shaping the administration foreign policy mainly because he believed that the Secretary of State had more experience and knowledge in the field of diplomacy than any American of his time. "Foster has been in training for this job all his life," Eisenhower often said.[12]

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[9] Berding, p. 14-15.

[10] Hans J. Morgenthau, "John Foster Dulles,". In Graebner, p. 304.

[11] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York, 1963), p. 86.

[12] Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: A Study of the Eisenhower Administration (New York, 1961), p. 89.

The respect and confidence that Eisenhower showed for his Secretary of State is displayed best and most accurately in a short statement the President once made regarding Dulles: "To me," Eisenhower said, "he is like a patriarch out of the Old Testament."[13] It is difficult, then, to disagree with the conclusion of Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz: "No Secretary of State in American history ever operated under such a prodigious mandate of authority as Eisenhower gave to Dulles, and which the President continuously renewed."[14]

John Foster Dulles, then, operated within a unique rhetorical situation. In comparison with prior Secretaries of State, he was free to set out the course he wished to follow. He was assured of the confidence of his superior, the backing of his party and subsequently the support of the majority of the American people.[15]

E. Prior Experience

Before turning to the manner in which Dulles chose to use his mandate, several additional factors about Dulles need to be mentioned.

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[13]Quoted in Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel At The Brink (New York, 1960), p. 36.

[14]Ibid., p. 12.

[15]See Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power (New York, 1963). Hughes' analysis is interesting. He argues that the Eisenhower administration's failures were largely failures of omission, rather than foolish or reckless acts. Eisenhower's chief defect, Hughes believed, was that he placed too much confidence in Dulles: "The great waste could be measured only by the vastness of the unused political resources at the command of the most powerful and popular leader of any free nation in the world. For Eisenhower had constantly enjoyed the freedom, so fantastically rare in a modern democracy, of the full and affectionate confidence of a people who would have followed him toward almost any conceivable military enterprise or diplomatic encounter." p. 344.

Almost literally speaking, Dulles spent a lifetime in training for his job as Secretary of State. He was born in Washington, D. C. in 1888, the son of Allen Macy Dulles, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Watertown in Northern New York State. His mother was Edith Foster whose father, John Watson Foster, had been Secretary of State under President Benjamin Harrison.[16] At the age of nineteen, his studies at Princeton were interrupted when he had the opportunity to accompany his grandfather to the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. After graduation from Princeton and George Washington University Law School, Dulles was employed as a lawyer with the firm of Sullivan and Cromwell.[17] When he was thirty, he was one of Wilson's five close advisers at Versailles and according to biographer John Robinson Beal, "The picture he got there of Wilson's idealism in conflict with a vengeful statesmanship at work in Europe left him absorbed, lifelong, with the great problem of how the world might achieve a just and durable peace."[18]

In addition to the introductions he received from an influential grandfather and his uncle Robert Lansing, Secretary of State for Woodrow Wilson, a rapid rise in the law firm gave Dulles opportunities to broaden his interests in foreign affairs. He served as a special agent for the State Department in Central America in 1917; he was assistant to the Chairman of War Trade Board in 1918; was counsel to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in 1918-1919; was legal advisor to the

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[16] Beal, p. 22.

[17] Ibid., p. 54.

[18] Ibid., p. 16.

Polish plan for financial stabilization in 1927; was American Representative to the Berlin Debt Conferences of 1933.

During the Twenties and Thirties, Dulles travelled widely, became a much-sought-after Republican speech maker, and published several articles. The Forties found him active in the nonpartisanship that both Presidents Roosevelt and Truman thought necessary in order to avoid the repetition of President Wilson's famous difficulties. He worked with the U. S. delegation at the United Nations initial meetings, served as Acting Chairman of the U. S. delegation at the United Nations General Assembly in 1948.

Throughout these years, Dulles maintained an active participation in the affairs of the Presbyterian Church. He was an active layman, a significant speaker, and a constant participant in church conferences both in Europe and the United States. His sister, Eleanor Lansing Dulles, affirms that "his religion was deep in the core of his being."[19]

It was generally believed at the time of the 1944 and 1948 elections, that if Governor Thomas Dewey had won, Dulles would most certainly have been his Secretary of State. Deane and David Heller, biographers of Dulles, described election night of 1948:

> Election night, 1948, was a memorable night for Janet and Foster Dulles. They were guests of honor at a gala dinner party given them by Ambassador and Mrs. Carlos P. Romulo of the Philipines. The party was to celebrate Dulles' forthcoming appointment as Secretary of State.[20]

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[19] Eleanor Lansing Dulles, John Foster Dulles: The Last Year (New York, 1963), p. 199.

[20] Deane and David Heller, John Foster Dulles: Soldier For Peace (New York, 1960), p. 128.

Instead of Washington, Dewey returned to Albany and Dulles to his law firm, but in 1949 Governor Dewey appointed him to the U. S. Senate to fill the seat left vacant by the resignation of Robert Wagner. The following year he ran for a full term against Herbert Lehman. "If you could see the kind of people," he told an upstate New York audience, "making up this block that is voting for my opponent, if you could see them with your own eyes, I know that you would be out, every last man and woman of you on Election Day."[21] Nation was outraged: "A man who so recklessly plays with fire in order to pick up votes is not a statesman, however 'powerful and original' his mind may be, but a culpable demagogue."[22] New Republic went further: "A candidate should be energetic, but the level of Dulles' political debate, the character of his attack on his opponent, must have come as a shock to thousands of people who have always supposed that Dulles, an able lawyer and an important leader of the Protestant Church, stood for high standards of probity in public life."[23]

Dulles lost the election and again returned to semi-private life. He next served as a consultant to Dean Acheson and in 1951 headed the task force that negotiated the Japanese Peace Treaty. The appointment was a tribute to President Truman since two years earlier, when Dulles was campaigning for the Senate, he warned New Yorkers about Truman's domestic programs: "If we don't do that here [defeat the Fair

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[21] Quoted in Nation, "Dulles As Demagogue," October 15, 1949, p. 361.

[22] Ibid.

[23] "Dulles In The Gutter," New Republic, October 24, 1949, p. 3.

Deal7 we will go down with the tide and we will have our children and our grandchildren fighting their way back--a bloody way--against the all-powerful state."[24]

Yet Japan was possibly Dulles' most brilliant moment.[25] "It was," Dulles reported on the Fifth Anniversary of the Treaty, "a treaty which put behind a spirit of vindictiveness and substituted a spirit of hope and reconciliation for the future."[26]

At the time, he warned those assembled who were inclined to treat Japan as most defeated nations had been treated throughout history:

> If you use the lash, if you exact reparations, if you constrict Japanese economic opportunity, if you act as jailer and master of slave labor, if you drive Japanese shipping off the seas and shut down her textile mills, you will create a peace that can only lead to bitter animosity and in the end drive Japan into the orbit of Russia.[27]

The next campaign saw Dulles supporting Eisenhower rather than Taft whose domestic political views were coincidental with his own. Dewey, in Dulles' behalf, arranged a meeting with Eisenhower and biographer Beal describes the result:

> To his pleasure, he found Ike's views about Europe coincided closely with his own. They agreed on the need for firm opposition to Communism, and on the NATO principle of collective defense;

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[24] Ibid.

[25] See Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process And Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1957)

[26] John Foster Dulles, "Commemorating Japanese Peace Treaty Signing," Department of State Bulletin, July 16, 1956, p. 96.

[27] Quoted in Beal, p. 121.

> they agreed heartily on the need for promoting Western European unity through the European Defense Community. They both felt it was highly important to keep alive the hope of eventual freedom in the Communist satellite nations.[28]

Eisenhower went on to defeat Taft at the convention and later Adlai Stevenson in the election. This time, the position of Secretary of State was not to elude Dulles. Richard Rovere reported very simply, "He very much wants that job and seems likely to get it."[29]

F. View of His Position

Dulles viewed his job as Secretary of State in a unique fashion and this needs next to be explained. He said:

> The task of the Secretary of State is an unending one. It can't be pursued individually. The Secretary of State has to be part of a team, the captain of which is the President. Also on the team is a vast organization in Washington, in and outside the State Department, and a huge organization abroad. They are all essential workers on the team.[30]

As spokesman for the captain of the team, Dulles viewed his job as a sort of roving policy maker who would spell out the general areas and leave their implementation to his subordinates. He travelled 559,988 miles during his tenure. Of these, 479,286 were outside the United States. He visited 47 nations, traveling to France 19 times; Great Britain, 11 times; Italy, 4 times; and West Germany, 6 times.[31]

This view of his job accounted for a great deal of the criticism that plagued Dulles. Hans J. Morgenthau wrote:

> Mr. Dulles, by doing what ambassadors are supposed to do, has not been able to do the job which only he could have done.

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[29] Rovere, p. 63.

[30] Berding, p. 9-10.

[31] Morgenthau, p. 305.

> Furthermore, he has wasted the prestige of his office on a multitude of minutiae magnifying them far beyond their intrinsic importance. He owes his unpopularity abroad and the foreign mistrust of his word in good measure to that assumption of functions which no Secretary of State ought to assume.[32]

Secretary Dulles placed so much emphasis on visitation that even the converse became an object for criticism. William Lee Miller complained that "nonvisitation becomes a diplomatic weapon, as when, after the European Defense Community was beaten in 1954, he pointedly did not stop in to see Mendes-France. Personal visitation becomes a normal channel of policy."[33]

Morgenthau links this emphasis on personal visitations with what he considered the chief failure of Dulles:

> The Secretary of State has been unable to perform adequately the very functions of policy formation which he considers his exclusive perogative. Not even the wisest and most experienced of Secretaries of State can afford to dispense with the information and advice of his subordinates; and the most travelled of Secretaries of State can afford it even less. The great abilities and greater self-confidence of Mr. Dulles have not compensated for this deficiency. In consequence, Mr. Dulles has not had the time nor the incentive, in terms of new knowledge and new ideas, to deal constructively with the drastic changes which have occurred in recent years on the international scene. This is one of the reasons why his tenure of office has been outstanding not for bold initiative and innovation in policy but rather for the virtually mechanical continuation of established routines long after they have served their purpose.[34]

William Harlan Hale held that as a result of his peculiar method of diplomacy "never perhaps has a Foreign Affairs chief been so cut off

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[32] Hans J. Morgenthau, "What The President and Mr. Dulles Don't Know," The New Republic. December 17, 1956. p. 16.

[33] William Lee Miller, "The 'Moral Force' Behind Dulles's Diplomacy," The Reporter. August 9, 1956. p. 17-18.

[34] Morgenthau, p. 16.

from his own authority, his colleagues, and his duties."[35]

All of the above has special significance when we appreciate Dulles' desire for bipartisanship. An astute student of history, Dulles realized the difficulties that former Secretaries had had with Congresses and with members of their political parties. Hale argues that Dulles tried to accommodate members of his own party by appointing Herbert Hoover, Jr. his Undersecretary:

> Hoover is for high tariffs, while his own chief is not. Dulles favors the exchange of scientific visits with the Soviet Union, but Hoover opposes them, fearing for our security. It was Hoover who during the Secretary's absence last year turned down Chou En-lai's bid for bilateral talks--a move Dulles disavowed on his return. . . . If it is true that Dulles has ingrained doubts as to the caliber or dependability of the officials about him, he may have had occasion by now to confirm them in the case of his hostage to Old Guard fortunes, Herbert Hoover, Jr.[36]

It is easy to understand the conflict in Dulles' view. He wanted to develop broad areas of policy and let his subordinates implement them; yet those whose task was to implement the policies held views that were often in conflict with his own. Morgenthau felt the conflict was unnecessary. "This writer is convinced that the price was unnecessarily high by far; for Dulles, fully supported by President Eisenhower's unprecedented prestige, could have pursued whatever foreign policies he chose without fear of domestic opposition."[37]

Dulles, however, wanted unanimity from the opposing party to reinforce his own beliefs of the correctness of his policies. He believed

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[35] William Harlan Hale, "The Loneliest Man In Washington," The Reporter. October 18, 1956, p. 16.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Morgenthau in Graebner, p. 308.

so strongly in his policies that he expected and sought such bipartisan support:

> I am profoundly convinced that, under the dangerous conditions of our time, our nation cannot be safe unless there is substantial unity on the fundamentals of our foreign policy. This is, of course, President Eisenhower's view, and, under his direction, I have sought to conduct foreign policy with the full knowledge and approval of the responsible representatives of both of our political parties. I am glad, as a Republican, to pay tribute to the Democratic cooperation I have received.[38]

Nor was Dulles content to accept criticism during political campaigns. He said during the 1956 presidential campaign:

> It is hoped that partisan debate will not disrupt or disparage this process which is necessary to give to United States policy the stability required if our friends abroad are to depend upon it and if our enemies abroad are to respect it.
>
> I know that no American will deliberately imperil his Nation. But that peril could result from careless or uninformed indulgence in partisan excesses. 'Politicking' is not as fully discounted abroad as it is discounted by the good sense of the American people.[39]

During the same campaign, Dulles warned:

> There is a danger point which I think all patriotic citizens should observe, and that is to not shake confidence abroad in the solidity of the U. S. position which has evolved over the last ten years, which involves the committal of the U. S. prestige and honor to various other countries and various places in the world. If there should grow up any doubt about our determination to stand on these commitments, it would be a very sad day for the United States and in my opinion would greatly increase the risk of war.[40]

John Foster Dulles, then, operated within a context that offered national unity, the support of his superior and the confidence of his

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[38] John Foster Dulles, "Bipartisanship In Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin. November 29, 1954. p. 808.

[39] John Foster Dulles, "Importance of Bipartisan Unity in Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin. December 12, 1955, p. 965.

[40] John Foster Dulles, "News Conference of January 24, 1956" Department of State Bulletin. February 6, 1956, p. 199.

political party. He asked for and largely received, at least during Eisenhower's first term, bipartisan support for his policies.

These policies, in Dulles' mind, had to operate within a religious and ethical framework, and he viewed the world from that framework. "Basically," he said, "the present conflict between freedom and despotism is a conflict between a spiritual and material view of the Universe and of the nature of man."[41] Winning the conflict required extraordinary means. "Our ultimate weapon is not dollars, is not guided missiles, is not weapons of mass destruction. The ultimate weapon is moral principle."[42] How to use moral principle? "Those who conceived this nation and brought it to life breathed into it a sense of mission. That mission was to show others, by conduct and example, that a free society could produce good fruits. That has been and still is our basic foreign policy."[43] It is to this theme of mission that we must now direct our focus.

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[41] John Foster Dulles, "The Challenge To Freedom," Department of State Bulletin. May 24, 1954, p. 780.

[42] John Foster Dulles, "Report On Berlin," Department of State Bulletin. March 8, 1954, p. 347.

[43] John Foster Dulles, "International Unity," Department of State Bulletin. June 21, 1954, p. 939.

II. THE MISSIONARY THEME

John Foster Dulles was not the first American to assume the role of preacher in American foreign policy. He was, rather, only one man in the long list of American political figures who justified and explained actions in moral language. He was only part of an American era that began with the victory of the United States in the Spanish-American War. Indeed, the seeds of mission were planted much earlier. Ronald Steele describes the assessment in this fashion:

> America did not choose to be a great power. She was born with great dreams and she had greatness thrust upon her. But once having achieved great power, once having had the responsibilities of defending European civilization first from nazism, and then from communism, the United States developed a sense of mission about the uses of her power. Just as she had inadvertently picked up an empire in Europe and Asia to compliment the one we had long enjoyed in Latin America, so she began to dream American dreams. She became absorbed not only in her own security and the defense of her closest allies from external aggression, but also in the effort to mold the world into an image conforming to her own conceptions of virtue.[1]

But the Dulles era was the climax of the dream. Now America had, so she thought, both the economic power and military might to construct her dream in all areas of the world. The task of articulating

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[1]Ronald Steel, Pax Americana, (New York, 1967), p. 315.

the vision and justifying the policies rested with Dulles, and all that he believed and thought he knew about history, religion and politics joined in the undertaking:

> I was once brought up in the belief that this nation of ours was not merely a self-serving society but founded with a mission to help build a world where liberty and justice would prevail. Today that concept faces a formidable and ruthless challenge from international communism. This has made it manifestly difficult to adhere steadfastly to our national idealism and national mission and at the same time avoid the awful catastrophe of war.[2]

In Dulles' enunciation of his dream, one sees readily the coalition of particular perceptions that he held regarding America, Christianity and the nature of the enemy. Each of these perceptions needs to be clarified before we can appreciate his missionary theme. Each needs to be examined separately, in so far as their isolation is possible, to appreciate the coalescence that shaped his views and subsequently the United States foreign policies of the Fifties.

A. View of America

The first constituent of Dulles' missionary theme was his view of America. It was the same panorama of faith, pride and optimism that characterized the populist movement. He believed in the America of frontier days: a rugged and sturdy people who solved their problems through faith, devotion, pride and initiative. Problems could not overwhelm a people who believed in God and worked hard and set their minds to solutions. He once told a Cleveland audience "that what is necessary

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[2] Quoted in Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel At The Brink (New York, 1960), p. 228.

is possible." "We must assume," he continued, "that what man by his ingenuity has created, man by his wisdom, resourcefulness, and discipline can harness and control."[3]

Individualism was part of the character of the people. Whether Dulles in later years never saw the urban problems of Washington or New York or whether he thought them atypical, the view of America that he formed in those early years never left him. During his brief term as New York senator, Dulles opposed the vast majority of the New Deal's social programs.[4] Early and late in his life, individualism and Americanism were inseparable.

> We Americans believe that our individualistic society best qualifies men for leadership. Such a society, we believe, provides the richness of diversity and of experimentation and the stimulus of competition.[5]

Further, Dulles believed that this individualism answered the question of why America became the great nation she was:

> That spirit of enterprise, that vision, that industry, and that rugged independence have been characteristics of our nation. There are indeed few Americans who cannot find in their family history similar stories of those who risked much and endured much to bring a dream into reality. It is those qualities which, within the short span of one hundred and fifty years, have brought our people from national infancy into forming the greatest nation on earth.[6]

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[3]Quoted in Eleanor Lansing Dulles, p. 196.

[4]For the best exposition of Dulles' domestic views, see his speech "The Blessings of Liberty," Vital Speeches. February 1, 1950, p. 231-236.

[5]John Foster Dulles, "Europe Must Federate or Perish," Vital Speeches. February 1, 1947, p. 236.

[6]Henry P. Van Dusen, ed., The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles (Philadelphia, 1959), p. 38.

But ruggedness was only part of America's greatness; the other was her spiritual foundation:

> Our nation was founded as an experiment in human liberty. Its institutions reflected the belief of our founders that men had their origin and destiny in God; that they were endowed by Him with inalienable rights and had duties prescribed by moral law, and that human institutions ought primarily to help men develop their God-given possibilities. We believed that if we built on that spiritual foundation we should be showing men everywhere the way to a better and more abundant life.[7]

This spiritual foundation of America's origins was the Great American Experiment, a common example in Dulles' speaking. He told the First Presbyterian Church at Watertown:

> Our forebears felt keenly that this Nation had a mission to perform. In the opening paragraph of the Federalist Papers it is said that "it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example," to show the way to political freedom. Our Declaration of Independence meant, as Lincoln said "liberty, not alone to the people of this country but hope for the world for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weight should be lifted from the shoulders of all men and that all should have an equal chance."
>
> What our forebears did became known as "the Great American Experiment." They created here a society of material, intellectual, and spiritual richness the like of which the world had never known. It was not selfishly designed, but for ourselves and others. We sought through conduct, example, and influence to promote everywhere the cause of human freedom. Through missionaries, physicians, educators, and merchants, the American people carried their ideas and ideals to others. They availed of every opportunity to spread the gospel of freedom, their good news, throughout the world. The performance so caught the imagination of the peoples of the world that everywhere men wanted for themselves a political freedom which could bear such fruits.[8]

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[7] John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York, 1950), p. 24.

[8] John Foster Dulles, "The Power of Moral Forces," Department of State Bulletin, October 19, 1953, p. 511.

Such a beginning also influenced our attitudes toward other nations, Dulles thought:

> The broad lines of United States foreign policy were set for us, long ago, by our founders. The opening paragraph of the Federalist Papers says that it seems to have been reserved to the American people, by their conduct and example, to show the possibilities of a free society. This opportunity was looked upon as one to show not merely for ourselves but for the benefit of all mankind.[9]

Dulles, to continue this reconstruction of his American view, felt the rest of the world responsive to the American ideal in their relations toward us:

> That made it easy to conduct the foreign policy of the United States. In those days influence and opportunity abroad and security at home came naturally as by-products of what our people stood for in the world. Americans were welcomed everywhere because, it was judged, they were working in a common human cause. Our economic opportunities were not circumscribed by fears and jealousies such as penned in many others. We were the least militarized of any Western nation, yet, for a century, we were not endangered. No foreign ruler could have brought his people to try to destroy the "great American experiment" which they admired and the spiritual fruits of which they shared.[10]

Nor was Dulles content to write only the American history. He extends his historical view to Western Europe, the source of our great religions. He wrote in Life Magazine in 1942:

> If we look back over the last two hundred years, that will make plain what I mean. Until the time of the First World War three peoples held undisputed leadership in the world. These three were the British, French, and ourselves. We three were not great because of our numbers, for no one of us constituted 10 per cent of the world's population. We were not great because of our natural wealth, for Great Britain and France are poor countries

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[9] John Foster Dulles, "The Moral Initiative," Department of State Bulletin. November 30, 1953. p. 741.

[10] Dulles, War or Peace, p. 255.

> and, during most of this period, the resources of the United States were undeveloped. We were great because our three peoples were imbued with and radiated great faiths. These were not perfect faiths, but they incorporated the Christian idea that man owes a duty to fellow man. We sought our own advantage, but we sought it in ways that would also advantage others. Our spirit was one of mission in the world. Often we were hypocrites, but even that showed that we felt under a moral compulsion to justify what we did as being for the welfare of others.[11]

Finally, Dulles felt that attitudes that worked in the past should be utilized in the future:

> Our people have wanted their government in its international conduct to do what was right and to redress what was wrong. Because of that sentiment our foreign policies throughout most of our history have been open, so that people could understand what was going on; and they have been conceived in moral terms. Today, international problems have become complicated. Also our own international responsibilities have become great, so that we must move prudently in formulating foreign policies. But I believe that we can still follow the good American tradition of openness, simplicity, and morality in foreign policy.[12]

It quickly becomes apparent that Dulles cannot separate America from its religious foundations. It is his view of Christianity that composes the second part of his missionary theme and this view needs next to be examined.

B. View of Christianity

Dulles was, of course, one of the most prominent Protestant laymen of the twenties, thirties, and forties. He served at religious meetings, councils, and organizations both in this country and abroad and still found time during his tenure as Secretary of State to address

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[11] Van Dusen, p. 47-48.

[12] John Foster Dulles, "Freedom And Its Purpose," The Christian Century. September 24, 1952. p. 1496.

and meet with these former friends and organizations. Dulles was until his death a religious man and this powerful influence cannot be overemphasized in tracing his views on political matters. Indeed, as Drummond and Coblentz wrote:

> His political thinking could no more be separated from his religion than a lighted bulb from its electric current. To the skeptical, his persistent religious terminology was sanctimonious. Yet it was anything but a deliberate technique aimed at giving his policies a moral sheen. There is simply no understanding Dulles without understanding the depth of his religious adherence. When he related his understanding of God-created man and moral law to policy, he was being his authentic self. For him to have spoken differently would have been false to himself.[13]

Dulles told the New York Herald-Tribune Forum in 1947:

> Two thousand years ago Christ said: "I am the way, the truth, and the life." Every one of those two thousand years sustains that utterance. The church spires which silhouette the skyline of America symbolize acceptance of his way. They point to a power above us from which derives our freedom.[14]

And he believed a Christian view no small part of the American tradition:

> The American people have been deeply influenced by that Christian directive. They did not ignore worldly things, but for the most part they did not exalt them as primary. Indeed, at the beginning, our people accepted great material insecurity in order to get freedom to worship God in their own way and to develop in themselves and their children what they believed to be God-given spiritual possibilities.[15]

Again, this view of Christianity influenced his notion of colonialism:

> At the time of the San Francisco Conference, we calculated that more than 700,000,000 people--about a third of the

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[13] Drummond and Coblentz, p. 76-77.

[14] Van Dusen, p. 69.

[15] John Foster Dulles, "The Blessings of Liberty," Vital Speeches. February 1, 1950. p. 234.

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[14] Van Dusen, p. 69.

[15] John Foster Dulles, "The Blessings of Liberty," Vital Speeches. February 1, 1950. p. 234.

> world's population--lived in a state of political dependency upon the West. That resulted from the fact that for several centuries the nations of the West had been materially, intellectually, and spiritually dynamic. Through developments like the Industrial Revolution the Western powers, with England in front rank, had invented tools that multiplied human energy many times and made it possible to produce what others wanted and could not get. Goods were produced which venturesome traders carried to the four corners of the earth.
>
> Because many of these people could not pay English pound sterling on the barrelhead, credits were extended and large investments were made in the undeveloped countries in the form of railroads, ports, irrigation projects, and the like. In order, however, for this process to work, there had to be a good measure of political security and monetary exchangeability. So the Western powers went on to provide government for peoples of the world who had not yet developed the political stability needed for trade and investment.
>
> This extension of Western dominance never resulted primarily from mere force. There was, to be sure, some fighting by Western armies in Asia and Africa. But these wars were minor. The great wars of modern times have been the wars among the Western powers themselves, not wars of the West against peoples of other civilizations. The political ascendancy of the West came about primarily because the West had something to offer which others wanted. Western ascendancy was not so much the work of generals as it was of diplomats, merchants, and missionaries.[16]

One would be hard-pressed to find a single speech given by Dulles to any audience, American or abroad, religious or political where he does not at some point speak of the spiritual side of man. Such a view of man is crucial, for, without it, according to Dulles, severe effects occur:

> If one does not believe in a spiritual order, if one does not accept the fact of moral law and what the Virginian Bill of Rights referred to as "the duty which we owe to our Creator," then it is, indeed difficult to combat the thesis that men should be the servants of the State; and that one State should be the master over all other States.[17]

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[16] Dulles, War or Peace, p. 74-75.

[17] John Foster Dulles, "The Challenge to Freedom," Department of State Bulletin. May 24, 1954. p. 780.

Thus Dulles viewed Christianity as a righteous faith, composed of responsibilities to 'go forth and teach all nations.' He found its history praiseworthy, proud and inseparable from the American way of life, and its early origins. Belief in Christianity was responsible for America's greatness as a nation.

C. View of the Enemy

We reach the third part of our reconstruction: Dulles' view of the enemy, his notions on communism. Here we find a type of polarization that permeates his career. Americanism-Christianity versus Communism with very little ground in the middle. "For their beliefs and ours," he wrote, "it is impossible to find a common denominator."[18] He characterized their side in this fashion: "Soviet Communism starts with an atheistic, Godless premise. Everything else flows from that premise."[19]

About communism, Dulles was convinced of three things: first, that communism was an international movement centered in Moscow; second, that communism was evil because it was materialistic and atheistic; third, that communism was doctrinal in nature and each Soviet response could be predicted and explained on the basis of communistic creed. Each of these characteristics is worthy of examination.

Dulles was certain that communism was international and that it was centered in Moscow:

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[18] Dulles, War or Peace, p. 187.

[19] Ibid., p. 8.

> International communism is that far flung clandestine political organization which is operated by the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Since 1939, it has brought 15 once independent nations into a state of abject servitude. It has a hard core of agents in practically every country of the world. The total constitutes not a theory, not a doctrine, but an aggressive, tough, political force, backed by great resources, and serving the most ruthless empire of modern times.[20]

His conception of communism was consistent. As early as 1947, he addressed the graduating seniors at Northwestern University and said:

> I shall speak of the international problem. The crux of that is the effort of Soviet leaders to impose widely their system of government. There is no reason to believe that the effort will stop of its own accord. If it stops, it will only be because something stops it. That something will be either violent resistance or a moral resistance so solid that to oppose it would evidently be futile. Clearly, Americans must see to it that there is a peaceful stoppage.[21]

Nor had he changed his mind in 1954:

> We are, indeed, confronted with something far more formidable than individual or national lust for glory and power. We are confronted with a massive system which, despite its present power, believes that it cannot survive except as it succeeds in progressively destroying human freedom. In so doing, it is restrained by no considerations of morality or humanity.[22]

It might appear that when the Soviets began talking more moderately than the Chinese communists, the fact might force Dulles to reconsider his notion. He did not:

> It is true that the Russian Communists have recently talked more softly, but it is equally true that the Chinese Communists

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[20]John Foster Dulles, "Intervention of International Communism in The Americas," Department of State Bulletin. March 22, 1954, p. 419.

[21]John Foster Dulles, "The Free State Versus The Police State," Vital Speeches. September 15, 1947, p. 719.

[22]John Foster Dulles, "The Challenge to Freedom," Department of State Bulletin, May 24, 1954, p. 781.

have talked and acted with increasing violence. They break their armistice agreements and they outrage the elemental decencies of international conduct.

Perhaps international communism is trying by a new way to divide the free nations. They seek to be soothing in Europe. They are provocative in Asia.[23]

In addition to the international aspects of communism, what seemed to disturb Dulles most about communism was its materialistic roots:

There is a moral or natural law not made by man which determines right and wrong and in the long run only those who conform to that law will escape disaster. This law has been trampled by the Soviet rulers and, for that violation, they can and should be made to pay.[24]

Orthodox Communists believe that there is no such thing as universal and equal justice, and that human beings are without soul or sacred personality. They are free of the moral restraints and compulsions which prevail in a religious society, and they think it quite right to use force and violence to make their way prevail.[25]

Communist practices derive from irreligious beliefs, he told still another audience:

Orthodox Communism denies the existence of God or of a moral law. It holds that individuals are soulless members of a social group. Their individual personality is unimportant. The material welfare of the group is all important.[26]

Communism almost by nature was incompatible with peace in the view of Dulles because communism lacked the moral law necessary for

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[23]John Foster Dulles, "The Goal of Our Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin. December 13, 1954, p. 890.

[24]Deane and David Heller, John Foster Dulles: Soldier for Peace (New York, 1960), p. 41.

[25]Van Dusen, p. 7.

[26]John Foster Dulles, "The Blessings of Liberty," Vital Speeches. February 1, 1950, p. 232.

restraint:

> It is inevitable that Orthodox Communism should reject peaceful ways, except as a matter of temporary expediency, because it rejects the moral premises that alone make possible the permanent organization of peace. Peace can never be stabilized except by institutions that seek to reflect the moral laws and that respect the dignity of the individual. There always has been, there always will be, human spirits that will rebel against totalitarian dictatorship, and that fact, in turn, requires such dictatorships to be violent and coercive.[27]

But Dulles also believed that this denial of morality was also the chief weakness of communism. "That is its Achilles heel, of which we must take advantage," he said. "We can take advantage of it if--but only if--we ourselves accept the supremacy of moral law."[28]

On another occasion, Dulles explained this weakness:

> The greatest weakness of our opponents is that they are professed materialists. They have forcibly extended their rule over some 800 million people, a third of the people of the world. They are seeking to make these people into a pliant, physical mass which completely conforms to the will of the rulers. But these people are religious people and they are patriotic people. They have shown that over two centuries. We believe that the Soviet rulers are attempting the impossible when they attempt to subject such people to their materialistic and repressive rule.
>
> We believe that the subject peoples have faith and hopes which cannot indefinitely be suppressed.[29]

Dulles, thirdly, believed that the motives and ambitions of the communists were to be found in their writings and that each of their actions could be explained in light of their creed. Andrew H. Berding, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs under Dulles,

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[27]John Foster Dulles, "Moral Leadership," Vital Speeches. September 15, 1948, p. 708.

[28]John Foster Dulles, "Morals and Power," Department of State Bulletin. June 29, 1953, p. 897.

[29]John Foster Dulles, "The Power of Moral Forces," Department of State Bulletin. October 19, 1953, p. 512.

reported:

> Dulles was quietly confident of his ability to handle his Soviet antagonists. This belief was partly based on the intense study he had given to the writing of communist leaders, particularly those of Lenin and Stalin. He had Stalin's Problems of Leninism on a small table just behind and to one side of his desk, alongside two other books to which he frequently referred--the Bible and the Federalist Papers. Frequently I saw him swivel around in his chair, pick up Stalin's volume, turn with surprising accuracy to close to what he was seeking, find the quotation and then say, "Now here's what Lenin says on this subject." I also saw him use quotations from Lenin to contradict a viewpoint Lenin's successors were trying to propagate. Dulles felt that his study of outstanding communist writings gave him a special insight into the thinking of communist rulers, and that he was therefore better able to counter their ambitions.[30]

But Dulles expressed the notion himself:

> The actual purposes of Soviet Communism are to be judged in the light of its official creed that is taught to the millions of Communists who make up the Party in Russia and in other countries. That creed is a far more reliable guide than the words that are occasionally uttered for our confusion.[31]

What is the creed? Dulles describes it:

> The entire creed of Soviet Communism is based upon this "dialectical materialism," the theory that there is no such thing as a moral law or spiritual truth; that all things are predetermined by the contradictory movements of matter; that so-called capitalism is historically fated to collapse; and that communism is the movement predestined to effect that collapse.[32]

To a national television audience, Dulles reaffirmed his belief in this doctrinal explanation of Soviet actions:

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[30]Andrew H. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (Princeton, 1965), pp. 30-31.

[31]Dulles, War or Peace, p. 6.

[32]John Foster Dulles, "Morals and Power," Department of State Bulletin. June 29, 1953, p. 896.

> Now you may ask how do we know that they are really trying to destroy us? Well, the answer to that one is that their leaders teach it openly and have been teaching it for many years, and everything that they do fits into that teaching. And in this country our courts have had to look into the question and they've found, most recently, only last week, that the Communist party in this country is part of a gigantic conspiracy designed to overthrow our Government by violence.[33]

Nor did the death of Stalin, the talk of coexistence or the new economic aid programs of the Soviets cause Dulles to reasses his beliefs. They remained largely the same as he told those assembled at Geneva in 1954:

> It may be said that Lenin and Stalin are dead. So they are. But their doctrine is not dead. It continues to be taught to Communists throughout the world, and they continue to practice it throughout the world.[34]

On still another occasion, Dulles said:

> Stalin is dead, but for 30 years his writings have been the Communist creed, and Stalinism in fact, though not in name, is still a potent influence in Russia. In prudence, therefore, we must act on the assumption that the present Soviet policies do not mark a change of purpose but a change of tactics.[35]

The talk of coexistence did not convince Dulles in the slightest:

> The Soviet rulers occasionally tell us that there could be "coexistence" between their society and ourselves. We must, however, beware of these professions. Coexistence is not

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[33]John Foster Dulles, "Enlightened Self-Interest," Vital Speeches. February 15, 1953, p. 265.

[34]John Foster Dulles, "Toward A Free Korea," Department of State Bulletin. May 10, 1954, p. 706.

[35]John Foster Dulles, "The New Phase of The Struggle With International Communism," Department of State Bulletin. December 19, 1955, p. 1003.

> part of a Soviet Communist creed or practice, except in the sense non-Communists are allowed, in a physical sense, to exist.[36]

Softening of policies was all a part of the Communist method, Dulles professed:

> Soviet Communist Doctrine has persistently taught retreat and zigzag as a tactic of conquest. So we cannot tell whether it is merely a maneuver. We have to have plans that fit either contingency. We must not rebuff a change which might be that for which the whole world longs. On the other hand, we must not expose ourselves to what could be mortal danger.[37]

Never questioning whether his own pessimism might rebuff that "for which the whole world longs," Dulles simply continued his rhetoric:

> Of course, we look anxiously for a sign of real change in the attitude of international Communists. We hope that the day will come when they will renounce the effort to rule the world by methods of force, intimidation, and fraud. When the new day dawns, we shall greet it eagerly. But we want to be sure that we do not mistake a false dawn for the real dawn.[38]

What the real dawn had to consist of, Dulles never told us. When the Soviets announced a large troop reduction in 1956, Dulles wrote:

> The United States welcomes the Soviet announcement of its intention to reduce its armed forces by 1,200,000 men within the next year, if this proves to be evidence of an intent to forego the use of force in international affairs. However, the obvious explanation is a need for greater manpower in industry and agriculture. I pointed this out last week before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and forecast that the

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[36] John Foster Dulles, "The Challenge to Freedom," Department of State Bulletin. May 24, 1954, p. 780.

[37] John Foster Dulles, "Confident of Our Future," Department of State Bulletin. October 24, 1955, p. 780.

[38] John Foster Dulles, "The Goal of Our Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin. December 13, 1954, p. 890.

> Soviet Union would probably shift a considerable body of manpower from the armed forces to the farms and factories.[39]

When the Soviets announced their participation in economic programs for Asian and African countries, Dulles responded:

> Their economic measures are superficially like economic aid measures which have long been pursued by the United States. Of course, honest imitation would be as welcome as the sincerest flattery. But economic measures adopted by the United States and the other free nations have demonstrably aided other nations to preserve their political independence and their distinctive social and cultural institutions. On the other hand, the Soviet and Chinese Communist purpose, as their history demonstrates, is to extend the sway of international communism, which, as Lenin said, involves "amalgamation of all nations." Soviet rulers have long held that among the first to be "amalgamated" would be "colonial and dependent peoples." Soviet purpose has not been changed by the fact that many of these people now enjoy independence.[40]

When the Soviets signed the Austrian Peace Treaty, Dulles again found an explanation:

> The recent liberation of Austria came about primarily because world opinion insistently demanded it as a step which represented elemental justice. In the same way world opinion will act as a compulsion on the Soviet Union to relax its grip upon East Germany and to permit the unification of Germany.[41]

When the Soviets talked of peace, Dulles explained the meaning of their kind of peace:

> The international Communists cannot establish it without first resorting to war. This they admit. Of course, they use propaganda, subversion, and menaces to soften up others in the hope

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[39] John Foster Dulles, "Reduction of Soviet Armed Forces," Department of State Bulletin, May 15, 1956, p. 880.

[40] John Foster Dulles, "Statement At SEATO Session," Department of State Bulletin, March 19, 1956, p. 450.

[41] John Foster Dulles, "Confident of Our Future," Department of State Bulletin. October 24, 1955, p. 642.

> that they will give in without resistance. That is their "peace offensive." But they foresee that many will never peacefully accept their rule. So Lenin taught, and Stalin agrees, that a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.[42]

This, then was Dulles' view of communism: international in scope, atheistic in practice and imbued with doctrinal predictabilities. In combination with his view of America and Christianity, it formed his missionary theme--the most characteristic theme in his rhetoric. He expressed it well in the words that he chose for inscription on the walls of his future library at Princeton:

> This nation of ours is not merely a self-serving society but was founded with a mission to help build a world where liberty and justice would prevail.
>
> Love of peace by itself has never been sufficient to deter war. There can never in the long run be real peace unless there is justice and law and the will and the capacity to use force to punish an aggressor. The task of winning peace and its necessary component justice, is one which demands our finest effort.[43]

Dulles was sincere in his use of the theme. This is demonstrated by the consistency and predictability of its use: in power and out of power, early in his career and late in his career, in this country and abroad, with different audiences and at different times. The theme was the same and even the words that expressed it remained largely the same.

In 1942, he wrote in an article in Life:

> If history teaches anything, it is that no nation is great and no nation is strong unless its people are imbued with a faith.

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[42] John Foster Dulles, "The Peace We Seek," Department of State Bulletin. January 24, 1955, p. 123.

[43] Quoted in Richard Goold-Adams, The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles (London, 1962), p. 312.

It also shows that no nation can be permanently great or permanently strong unless that faith be a righteous faith that is compatible with the welfare and the dignity of others.[44]

That same year, he predicted:

As our national faith thus grows and is made manifest by works, its influence will be contagious throughout the world. As the evil faiths that combat us collapse, leaving death and ruin as their fruit, the faith that makes us strong will encompass the earth. It will unite men, as never before, in common and constructive purpose.[45]

In 1947 at Northwestern University he suggested:

We can, and I hope we shall, continue to set the example of a good way of life. We shall, I hope, continue to be imbued with a righteous faith and a sense of mission in the world. We shall, I hope, use enlightened judgment in applying our resources and our resourcefulness to help others to help themselves.[46]

Additionally, in 1949 he lectured to the American Political Science Association:

The great need of our time is to recapture faith in the infinite possibilities of the individual human being and to translate that faith into works. That is the way, the only way, to surmount the grave perils, domestic and foreign, that confront our nation.[47]

Again, the theme was the same in 1952 as he warned the alumni of Princeton University:

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[44] Van Dusen, p. 51

[45] Van Dusen, p. 99-100.

[46] John Foster Dulles, "The Free State Versus The Police State," Vital Speeches. September 15, 1947, p. 720.

[47] John Foster Dulles, "The Blessings of Liberty," Vital Speeches. February 1, 1950, p. 234.

> There comes a time in the life of every great people when their work of creation ends. They lose their sense of purpose and of mission in the world, seeking only to conserve what they have. Material things begin to seem more important than spiritual things and security means more a matter of military defense than of spiritual offense.[48]

Nor did the text change much three years later when he told the Illinois Manufacturer's Association:

> It would indeed be tragic if our people, and particularly our youth now became so attracted by mercenary considerations, by the lure of the market place, that they lost the missionary spirit, the sense of destiny, which has been characteristic of our Nation since its beginning and which has made it great.[49]

And almost tragically, certainly sadly, when Dulles knew he would not recover from the cancer that would take his life, he resigned his position on April 15, 1959. His letter of resignation maintains the same theme he had been preaching long before he ever knew he would have the power to try to implement it. He wrote to the President:

> I was brought up in the belief that this Nation of ours was not merely a self-serving society but was founded with a mission to help build a world where liberty and justice would prevail. Today that concept faces a formidable and ruthless challenge from International Communism. This has made it manifestly difficult to adhere steadfastly to our national idealism and national mission and at the same time avoid the awful catastrophe of war. You have given inspiring leadership in this essential task and it has been a deep satisfaction to me to have been intimately associated with you in these matters.[50]

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[48] John Foster Dulles, "Importance of Initiative in International Affairs," Vital Speeches. March 15, 1952, p. 334.

[49] John Foster Dulles, "The New Phase of The Struggle With International Communism," Department of State Bulletin, p. 1006.

[50] John Foster Dulles, "Secretary Dulles to President Eisenhower," Department of State Bulletin. May 4, 1959, pp. 619-620.

D. Summary

This chapter describes the missionary theme in the rhetoric of John Foster Dulles. It has reconstructed his view of America as a Christian nation with a heritage of faith and individualism; it has reconstructed his view of Christianity as a religion. It has reconstructed his view of communism as an international movement, materialistic and grounded in an atheistic creed.

Taken together, his views constitute the missionary theme. The theme was constant, sincere and usable. "Whoever would understand our policy," Dulles once said, "should try to comprehend us as a nation."[51] It is now our task to determine whether the theme was given substance by the political acts of Dulles.

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[51] John Foster Dulles, "Challenge And Response in United States Policy," Department of State Bulletin. October 7, 1957, p. 578.

III. THE RHETORIC AND THE POLITICS

In describing the relationship between Dulles' rhetoric and his politics, it becomes quickly apparent that the two were often not reconcilable. The moralist in Dulles was in constant conflict with political urgencies and the results were often unsatisfactory for both. Two important issues may illustrate this collision.

A. Neutralism

The issue of "neutrality" was a substantive one that demonstrates the missionary theme in the rhetoric of Dulles. It additionally indicates the weaknesses of such a theme when trying to reassure two types of nations with which we sought close relationships: those allies that entered into mutual security agreements and those nations that chose to remain nonaligned with either of the two great powers. Our actual policy was to accomodate both types of nations; our rhetoric, as indicated by Dulles, favored one type over the other.

The issue of neutrality began, not with Dulles, but with a question asked President Eisenhower at a news conference, June 6, 1956. Eisenhower said in part:

> Now, today there are certain nations that say they are neutral. This doesn't necessarily mean what is so often interpreted to mean, neutral as between right and wrong or decency and indecency.

> They are using the term "neutral" with respect to attachment to military alliances. And may I point out that I cannot see that that is always to the disadvantage of such a country as ours.
>
> If a nation is truly a neutral, if it is attacked by anybody--and we are not going to attack them--public opinion of the world is outraged.
>
> If it has announced its military associations with another great power, things could happen to it, difficulties along its borders and people would say, "Good enough for it. They asked for it."
>
> So let us not translate this meaning of the word "neutral" as between contending military forces, even though the conflict is latent, and neutral as between right and wrong.[1]

The White House felt obliged to release an additional statement, according to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "when foreign embassies began telephoning on June 7 to find out the practical meaning of the President's press conference of the previous day."[2] Why join a collective defense arrangement with the U.S. when its own President defends neutralism so strongly?

The new statement still distinguished between what might be called political neutrality and moral neutrality, but now gave a boost to the 42 nations with which the United States held collective-defense arrangements, referring to these treaties as "the best and most effective means of preserving world order within

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[1]Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Press Conference of June 6, 1956," reprinted in United States News and World Report. June 15, 1956, p. 113.

[2]Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Neutrality: Varying Tunes," Foreign Affairs. October, 1956, p. 57.

the framework of the United Nations Charter."[3] The statement reaffirmed, however, the President's belief "that there are special conditions which justify political neutrality" but that no nation has the right to be indifferent to the fate of another, or, as he put it, to be "neutral as between right and wrong or decency and indecency."[4]

Eisenhower's statement and his previous press conference managed to create a thin and delicate balance, a position that might not overjoy both India and Pakistan and their counterparts, but could at least placate them.

Secretary Dulles, however, snapped the tight rope the following week at Ames, Iowa. Addressing the commencement exercises at Iowa State University on June 9, Dulles eulogized the collective defense arrangements:

> These treaties abolish, as between the parties, the principal of neutrality, which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This has become an increasingly obsolete conception, and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception. The free world today is stronger, and peace is more secure because so many free nations courageously recognize the now demonstrated fact that their own peace and safety would be endangered by assault on freedom elsewhere.[5]

The language that Dulles chose seemed to contradict what Eisenhower had said earlier. "Indifferent to the fate of others," "increasingly obsolete conception," "immoral and shortsighted conception"

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[3]Dwight D. Eisenhower, "President's Statement of June 7, 1956," reprinted in United States News and World Report, June 15, 1956, p. 113.

[4]Ibid.

[5]John Foster Dulles, "The Cost of Peace," Department of State Bulletin. June 18, 1956. p. 999-1000.

are the words of the moralist, the language of one who sees truth on one side and expects others to share the same view. In any case, Richard Goold-Adams suggests that "his use of the word 'immoral' had made world headlines and had brought down on his head a whole cascade of abuse."[6] America editorialized that his frank statement was "not calculated to better United States relations with India, Indonesia and the other uncommitted nations of Asia."[7]

Before examining the responses of some Asian leaders, it is necessary to pursue Dulles' position. The issue was raised at two press conferences and Dulles had the opportunity to explain, if not justify, his view. The first press conference was concerned with the seeming contradiction between Eisenhower and Dulles. Dulles was asked the following:

> Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to be a great deal of confusion as concerns the statement you made in your speech the other day about neutrality being "immoral" and the President's statement almost simultaneously that he wouldn't be at all surprised that some nations preferred to, in view of the risks involved in becoming members of an alliance--how do you reconcile those two points of view?
>
> Dulles: In the first place, I point out that the quoted language you attribute me is not complete or accurate. In the second place, I would point out that there is no difference whatever between the President and myself on the subject. I had a long discussion with him in the course of other matters on Thursday afternoon (June 7), and I can assure you that there is no difference whatever in our points of view. As far as language differences

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[6]Richard Goold-Adams, The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles (London, 1962), p. 263.

[7]"The 'Immorality' of Neutralism," America. June 23, 1956, p. 298.

are concerned, I think you can probably find I have expressed my own view on the subject a good many times over the last decade, perhaps 50 times, and I doubt if on any two of those 50 occasions I used precisely the same language. You can find a difference in my expression on every one of those 50 occasions. But I do not think that my views have changed. As the President said, it is a complicated subject and it is not possible to find a precise formula of identical words to deal with the subject as it comes up in different contexts.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you explain the circumstances under which the clarifying statement on neutrality was issued by the White House on Thursday?

Dulles: No, the White House would issue its own statement if it thought fit to do so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech in which you said that the concept of neutrality was increasingly obsolete except under very exceptional circumstances, would you tell us what kind of circumstances you consider would not render it obsolete?

Dulles: Well, the outstanding example of neutrality is, of course, Switzerland, Switzerland has declined to join the United Nations because it recognizes that the United Nations Charter is incompatible with strict neutrality.

Q. Well, would you apply that exceptional term to states like India and Indonesia, for example?

Dulles: I don't care at this time to get into naming states and passing judgment upon the course of action of other governments.

Q. Could we put the question this way then, sir? Is it your feeling that those states which have joined alliances with the United States and other Western countries as of today should remain in them but you have no objection to those which do not at the moment have such alliances remaining outside them? Is it the status quo on that problem that you were approving?

Dulles: I am afraid that, if I tried to answer that question, you would find in the answer a fifth version, which you would then compare with the preceding fourth or third or second or first. I believe enough has been said on that subject to make quite clear the views of the administration with reference to neutrality.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it fair then for us to infer from what you said this morning that there is no difference within this administration, and all the reporting on this subject is misleading the people as to the position of this government?

Dulles: Well, I don't want to pass judgment upon the reporting. I can say, and repeat what I said, which is that I had a discussion on this subject with the President on Thursday afternoon, and I am satisfied that there is no difference of opinion between the President and myself on that subject.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you talk to the President before his Wednesday press conference on the subject? He gave his remarks on neutrality as a volunteered statement, not in answer to a question.

Dulles: I prefer not to answer that. I think that the details of the personal relations between the President and myself don't lend themselves to public exposition.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you agree with what the President said on this subject?

Dulles: I have said that there is no difference that I can detect between the views of the President and myself on this subject.[8]

Several weeks later, Vice President Richard Nixon, on a trip around the world, addressed a Manila audience and warned neutrals about the perils of accepting aid from the communists. Later in Karachi, Nixon continued his argument at a press conference. "Any country," he said, "that will accept military aid or economic aid from a Communist country runs almost certain risk of having a rope tied around its neck."[9]

Then, asked about the remarks Prime Minister Nehru had made, which suggested that the views of Nixon were not very democratic,

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[8]John Foster Dulles, "Press Conference of June 12, 1956," Department of State Bulletin. June 25, 1956.

[9]Richard M. Nixon, "Reds Try to Make Satellites out of Neutrals," United States News and World Report. July 20, 1956, p. 89.

Nixon replied:

> In view of that fact I then reached the conclusion that Communism was out of step with the real desires of the Asian peoples, to have independence and freedom, because international Communism of the Peking and Soviet variety is completely inconsistent with freedom, and my answer to Mr. Nehru would be that anyone who suggests that Communist assistance, for example, is not inconsistent with independence and freedom is not reading correctly the lessons of history.[10]

Nixon's remarks in Asia were the object of some questions at Dulles' July 11 press conference and again Dulles reflected on neutrality:

> Q. Mr. Secretary, are you in agreement with what Mr. Nixon has been saying in Asia about Communist aid and the willingness of the United States to continue aid to countries that are receiving economic aid from the Communists?
>
> Dulles: I would merely say about that that I believe Vice President Nixon has very effectively and well expounded U.S. policy in the countries which he has visited. I don't recall the precise language to which you refer, but I am quite familiar in general with what Vice President Nixon has said in these countries and I would say in general I am quite in accord with it.
>
> . . .
>
> Q. Mr. Secretary, do you still believe that neutralism is immoral?
>
> Dulles: I believe what I said, which is that the kind of neutralism which is indifferent to the fate of others and which believes security can best be sought in isolation and without concern for others--I said that kind of neutrality I believe is immoral. I did not say neutralism of all kinds is immoral. I described the kind of neutralism which I think is immoral and to that view I still adhere.
>
> Q. How is that expressed in the international field, Mr. Secretary?
>
> Dulles: It is first of all expressed through membership, I would say, in the United Nations, which itself commits all of the members to the principle of standing together as against aggression. That indicates a concern for others. Now, of course, as we know, the operation of that provision of the United Nations Charter is subject to being impeded by the veto power in the Security Council.

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[10] Ibid, p. 90

> The concept of mutual help, which is expressed in the United Nations Charter, has been translated in a good many cases into the collective-security arrangements which are permitted under Article 51 of the Charter, which is written, and I helped write it, for the reason of having an alternative to the Security Council and its veto power. So the concept of nations' being willing to help each other is inherent in the United Nations Charter and is also inherent in the collective-security arrangements made under Article 51 of the Charter, which was devised to permit overcoming the possible veto power in the Security Council.
>
> . . .
>
> Q. Mr. Secretary, the definition of a concern for others as being expressed through membership in the United Nations means, as a practical matter, does it not, that there practically aren't any neutrals in the world? Practically all the countries which have been able to get into the United Nations are there.
>
> Dulles: Yes, with one exception, Switzerland, which has felt that its membership in the United Nations would be inconsistent with its traditional policy of neutrality. I would not want even there to say that the neutrality of Switzerland was immoral. It is based upon a very special set of circumstances and I think, in the statement which I made, and which has been alluded to by another questioner, I said that "except under very exceptional circumstances," and there could be exceptional circumstances, I think perhaps are, in the case of Switzerland. But Switzerland has not joined the United Nations, although it could do so, because it felt that was inconsistent with its traditional policy of neutrality.[11]

Thus Dulles spoke his "last word" on the subject and his statement completed the full circle: neutralism was obsolete and immoral, but there were really no neutrals in the world, as he saw neutralism, except Switzerland. It was, however, all right for Switzerland to be neutral, since for Switzerland to be nonneutral "would be inconsistent with its traditional policy of neutralism."[12]

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[11] John Foster Dulles, "Press Conference of July 11, 1956," Department of State Bulletin. July 23, 1956, p. 146.

[12] Ibid., p. 147.

As Dana Adams Schmidt, writing for the New York Times suggested, "Mr. Dulles entered the fray on neutralism on June 9 with a declaration fortissimo. Today his last word on the subject was by comparison, pianissimo."[13]

Anthony Eden, in his memoirs, refers to Dulles as "a preacher in a world of politics" and suggested that "Mr. Dulles seemed sometimes to have a little regard for the consequences of his words..."[14] His lectures on neutrality are surely a prime example of Dulles' certainty about his own moral position. Commonweal wrote the proper indictment of the statements that occurred that month:

> In striving to enunciate its position on the vexed question of neutralism the Administration has seemingly adopted the semantic theory of W.H. Auden, the poet who queried: "How do I know what I meant until I see what I have said?" Within only a few weeks the three highest spokesmen for the Administration have stated almost every possible position toward neutralism.[15]

Why Dulles changed his public position on neutralism is a question open to speculation. In any case, his original position on neutralism suggested that "except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception" and when asked whether India and Indonesia were the sorts of exceptions he

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[13]Dana Adams Schmidt, "View on Neutrals Eased by Dulles," The New York Times, p. 43.

[14]Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Boston, 1960), p. 71.

[15]"Neutrals and Neutralism," Commonweal. August 3, 1956, p. 434.

meant and he replied that he "didn't care at this time to get into naming states and passing judgment upon the course of action of other governments,"[16] his meaning seemed clear enough to the Asian countries and they took his words as a sermon on absolutism.

Nehru told the West German Foreign Policy Association following Dulles' Iowa address:

> The United States expects others to follow its will. If they do not, they feel hurt and think there is something wrong with the other man's thinking. This kind of thinking leaves no room for any country to sit on the fence. If carried to its final end, it divides the world into two hostile camps, each of which is ready to spring at the throat of the other.
>
> No nation should try to force its views on another. That would be domination.
>
> Nor do I believe that any nation should call another immoral for not going its way. That is the approach of the religious or the dogmatic. As for myself, I believe in no religion or dogma or faith.[17]

William Lee Miller, writing of Dulles' tendency to argue in absolutistic language, suggests that: "It can leave a man unable to bend, to see how right and wrong may look from the other fellow's position. Without at least some sense of relativity, the American moralist can end up talking a language no one else in the world understands."[18]

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[16]John Foster Dulles, "Press Conference of June 12, 1956," Department of State Bulletin. June 25, 1956.

[17]J. Nehru, "Nehru Scores U.S. on Cold War," New York Times, July 15, 1956, 1:2.

[18]William Lee Miller, "The 'Moral Force' Behind Dulles's Diplomacy," The Reporter, August 9, 1956, p. 19.

It seems clear that Dulles was not communicating with Nehru. At a news conference, the American view of neutralism again came up and Nehru said:

> Also, I would not dare to say that anyone or any country, even those who are totally and absolutely opposed to our policies, I would not dare to say that they are immoral. I think that would take me to a certain religious and philosophical sphere, and I am no judge of morality and immorality of that type. I said recently, I forget where, "I am a pagan," and I rejoice in being a pagan. And a pagan's chief virtue was tolerance of opinion and not to impose one's opinion or religion or ways of life on others. I think that pagan outlook is, to that extent (I am not extending it to the religious sphere), it is a very democratic outlook. Therefore, I venture to say that countries that are not aligned are functioning in the real democratic way. They are not giving up their freedom of thinking, freedom of action, freedom of explaining their position to others by tying themselves up to some policy with which, on occasion, they may not agree. That really means aligning, a measure of regimentation.[19]

Nehru explained that regimentation can come from both sides and that both are opposed to democracy as India sees it.

> Let us take into consideration the fears and apprehensions and all that. Let us deal with them step by step. Let us solve problems step by step. But what I venture to say is that the cold-war approach has no particular meaning if you have ruled out the hot-war approach. And if you, therefore think so, then all this approach of neutralism, and "anti" this and "anti" that, is not a happy approach.[20]

It is clear that President Sukarno of Indonesia agreed with Nehru. Addressing the Foreign Policy Association in New York, two weeks before Dulles' Iowa speech, Sukarno said:

> We have grown accustomed to seeing our policy and that of many other nations described as "neutralist." Our policy

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[19] J. Nehru, "We Seek Friendly Relations With All," United States News and World Report. July 20, 1956, p. 89.

[20] Ibid.

> is not one of neutrality. We do not attempt to withdraw from world conflicts. We believe that we have a part to play in those conflicts.
>
> Our interest is in a world at peace and we act and will continue to act in order to reach that condition. It is true that we are independent of the great power blocs in the world. It is equally true that we shall remain independent.
>
> We believe that the division of the world into two camps is not the way to the unity of mankind. If we were directly involved in the conflict the chances of doing anything to bridge the gap would be lessened, for the other side would distrust us and pay no heed to us.
>
> Because we are independent of either bloc, and because we are actively seeking means of conciliation, we refer to our foreign policy as being independent and active. But, I repeat, it is not neutral, and it will never be neutral so long as man's tyranny exists anywhere in the world.[21]

Both Nehru and Sukarno understood the moral premise of black and white that permeated Dulles' pronouncements on neutralism. Both rejected it and eventually Dulles himself had to restate, even if not rethink this position. Two ironies regarding his stance need to be indicated.

First, the American tradition that Dulles spoke about so often had itself argued a position of neutralism for most of its own history. The reasons were those that Washington articulated so well in his Farewell Address; it is even ironic that Dulles quoted this speech so often:

> Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are necessarily

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[21]Sukarno, "What Sukarno Said About Neutrality and Military Aid," United States News and World Report. June 15, 1956. p. 112.

> foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships and enmities.[22]

When, in the mid nineteenth century we refused to side with Britain against Russia, they too wondered "that the U.S. could stand aloof from a cause that concerned free men everywhere."[23]

When the tables were turned and we wondered how those neutralists could stand aloof, Saturday Review reminded Dulles and us that "the replies of those nations sound as though they were copied out of American newspaper editorials or speeches in Congress in 1856."[24]

> This doesn't mean that we were necessarily right or wrong a century ago or that the Asian and African nations are necessarily right or wrong now. What it does mean is that it is entirely natural for peoples who have recently acquired national independence to concentrate on their own problems. At the very least we ought to remember how we felt and acted under similar circumstances. . . And the evidence mounts today that we are only hurting ourselves by attempting to export our conception of the cold war to areas that have mammoth problems of their own. For our impatience and anger have produced hostile reactions.[25]

The second irony about the neutralism issue is a more serious one. In practice, we economically supported countries from both groups; that is, both our allies and those who chose to remain non-aligned.

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[22]George Washington, "Farewell Address," The World's Orators, ed. Guy Carleton Lee (New York, 1900), p. 315.

[23]"The Grand Commitment," The Saturday Review, May 26, 1956, p. 22.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid.

Dulles himself said of India two years before the Iowa speech:

> We should remember that among free nations there is room for diversity of views. We should not let our wish to help the people of India develop their nation be swayed by any temporary differences, however important. It is essential that we continue to help if for no other reason than to serve our enlightened self-interest. It would be a tragic day for us if the confidence which India's people have in their democratic institutions should fail.[26]

And Commonweal, after outlining the confusion created by the issue of neutralism, concludes:

> Fortunately, the actions of this government have spoken more clearly than its words. As a matter of practical, political fact, it has shown a tolerant attitude toward neutralism by continuing aid of different kinds to countries of almost every neutralist hue. That, perhaps, is the nub of the matter--that there be a greater awareness in political circles that this country is dealing not with neutralism, but with neutralisms, and that no adjective or action is equally applicable to all.[27]

Dulles, in fact, outlines this very view in the same Iowa speech:

> Is our foreign aid wasted because the recipients are not grateful enough or not subservient to our views? No, because we do not seek either gratitude or subservience. We know that gratitude can never be bought, and we do not spend taxpayers' money on the folly of such an effort. Neither do we seek or want subservience. Our policies command wide respect abroad because of their intrinsic merit. But the success of our foreign aid program is to be tested not by gratitude, not by subservience, but by whether it makes more vigorous the freedoms elsewhere that butress the freedom of ourselves. By that test, our program works.[28]

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[26]John Foster Dulles, "Maintaining Free World Unity," Department of State Bulletin. June 14, 1954, p. 923.

[27]"Neutrals and Neutralism," Commonweal, August 3, 1956, p. 434.

[28]John Foster Dulles, "The Cost of Peace," Department of State Bulletin. June 18, 1956, p. 1002.

In conclusion, we see the missionary theme in Dulles' pronouncements on neutralism. His own rhetorical posture demanded he use the theme; political considerations forced him to compromise the issue out of existence. It had no relevance to political action, save possibly its negative effects of ill will in Asia and the confusion it created about America's intentions.

B. Liberation

While the issue of neutralism was a relatively brief one, the issue of liberation remained with Dulles throughout his tenure as Secretary of State. The first formal mention of the issue occurred in the Republican Platform of 1952. Dulles had a major part in drafting the statement, which said in part:

> The Government of the United States, under Republican leadership, will repudiate all commitments contained in secret understandings such as those of Yalta which aid communist enslavements. It will be made clear, on the highest authority of the President and the Congress, that United States policy, as one of its peaceful purposes, looks happily forward to the genuine independence of those captive peoples.[29]

The first notion that Dulles meant the issue to be more than campaign oratory occurred immediately after Eisenhower's inauguration. Addressing the nation on January 27, 1953, Dulles said:

> Our nation must stand as a solid rock in a storm-tossed world. To all those suffering under Communist slavery, to the timid and the intimidated peoples of the world, let us say this, you can count upon us. Together with the other peoples of the world we can, I am confident, peacefully achieve an honorable peace.[30]

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[29]Quoted in Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York, 1956), p. 47.

[30]John Foster Dulles, "Enlightened Self-Interest," Vital Speeches, February 15, 1953, p. 267.

The issue was so vague that it was potentially dangerous. The London Economist wrote in August of 1952: "Unhappily 'liberation' . . . means either the risk of war or it means nothing . . . 'Liberation' entails no risk of war only when it means nothing."[31]

Through the years of his stewardship, Dulles never explained exactly what the term was supposed to mean or what action was to bring about the goal. Biographer Beal contends "it represented the difference between a dynamic and a static response to dynamic Communist expansion."[32]

Sherman Adams reported a difference of opinion between Eisenhower and Dulles on the matter.

> Eisenhower had spoken of freeing such people"by peaceful instruments." Talking on the same subject in Buffalo a few days later, Dulles, attacking the Truman policy as the containment of enslaved peoples under Communist domination, called for liberation but significantly omitted to mention the use of "peaceful means" in accomplishing it. Eisenhower called Dulles to task on this difference in their words. The apparent belligerency of the Dulles speech caused some fear in Europe that the Republicans might go so far as to make war to free these peoples. Dulles readily admitted that Eisenhower was right and that his own choice of words had been wrong. The following week Eisenhower restated his attitude emphatically in another speech in Philadelphia: "To aid by every peaceful means, but only by peaceful means, the right to live in freedom."[33]

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[31]Quoted in Hans J. Morgenthau, "John Foster Dulles," An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, ed. Norman A. Graebner (New York, 1961), p. 293.

[32]John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles: A Biography (New York, 1957), p. 310.

[33]Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration. (New York, 1961), p. 88.

Yet Dulles pressed the issue in such a constant and ambiguous form that he cannot be declared completely innocent of the tragic happenings at Budapest. Consider these references:

On November 18, 1953, addressing the C.I.O. Convention in Cleveland, Dulles said:

> Such a system, unless it changes, is doomed ultimately to collapse. The time of collapse depends largely on whether we produce the richer fruits of freedom; whether that is known behind the Iron Curtain; and whether these captive peoples also know that they are not forgotten, that we are not prepared to seek safety for ourselves by a bargain with their masters which will confirm their captivity.[34]

On January 27, 1953, addressing the nation in his first broadcast as Secretary of State, Dulles said:

> And a great deal can be done to make these peoples, these captive peoples, retain such a love of freedom and independence and to bring such a love and determination to keep independence on the part of these peoples that I've talked about who are menaced that they can't be swallowed and digested by Soviet Communism. And perhaps in time the indigestion will become so acute that it might be fatal.[35]

On November 29, 1954, speaking to the National 4-H Club Congress at Chicago, Dulles said:

> Liberation normally comes from within. But it is more apt to come from within if hope is constantly sustained from without. That we are doing in many ways.[36]

One final reference needs to be noted. Dulles, in October of 1957, comes close to giving the issue substance:

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[34]John Foster Dulles, "The Moral Initiative," Department of State Bulletin. November 30, 1953, p. 744.

[35]John Foster Dulles, "Enlightened Self-Interest," Department of State Bulletin. February 15, 1953, p. 267.

[36]John Foster Dulles, "The Goal of Our Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin. December 13, 1954, p. 893.

> United States policy, as proclaimed repeatedly will never sanction these injustices nor accept them as permanent. But we strive only by peaceful means to achieve justice. It would not be in the general interest, nor in the interest of the peoples directly concerned, for events to shape up into war. We shall continue to employ all the resources of the United Nations and all diplomatic means and moral pressures to alleviate the injustices and oppressions suffered by these peoples and to make their plight known to world opinion.[37]

Dulles, of course, was not a consistent man. Consistency is a luxury that ideologues in politics can ill afford. Adlai Stevenson struggled through two political campaigns, attempting to talk sense to the American people. History will record his deliberate failure to give simple solutions to complex problems. Yet only a few years later, Stevenson found himself in conflict when representing American policy at the United Nations. History must record this aspect of his life to understand the complete man.

No less an ideologue than J. William Fulbright finds himself every six years in shirtsleeves, munching on fried chicken and concentrating upon the realities of Arkansas politics. For the brief campaign, his views on what America might have been and what she still can salvage are outweighed by that which he must do to return to Washington.

Men in politics do not and cannot always speak for themselves. Speeches and policies do not occur in vacuums; they occur in complicated situations that are both rhetorical and political. The dilemma of the ideologue is that some situations force him to compromise,

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[37]John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1957, p. 577.

while compromise can be especially painful to an ideologue.

Dulles believed profoundly in the principle of rollback. He was, of course, guilty of vagueness in defining his meaning of liberation. When accused of this vagueness, he violently protested and urged his critics to read his book when he clearly stated that liberation must be a peaceful transition.[38] If the Hungarians had read his book, perhaps the revolution would not have occurred. Instead, they heard the generalities through airwaves, and never the specific fact that we could not and would not give specific assistance. "The mere fact," Edmond Taylor wrote, "that the United States over a period of years had encouraged the captive populations of Eastern Europe to resist Soviet Communism engenders false hopes."[39]

Biographer Beal, in Dulles' behalf, takes comfort in the fact that "perhaps a few broadcasts of Radio Free Europe might have been interpreted as urging revolt," but they were "not the official broadcasts."[40] Neither Beal nor Dulles ever explained how a Hungarian revolutionist was to distinguish between the official and unofficial broadcasts. More reasonable is the statement of one Hungarian revolutionist who remarked with no small degree of anger and frustration:

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[38]See especially his letter to the editor of Commonweal. October 3, 1952, p. 631.

[39]Edmond Taylor, "The Lessons of Hungary," Reporter. December 27, 1956, p. 18.

[40]Beal, p. 314-315.

> For eight years the United States has been telling us through Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America to resist Communism. But when resistance finally leads to revolution you stand by and watch the damned Russian tanks shoot us down without lifting a finger.[41]

How does the theme of liberation relate to Dulles' rhetoric and politics? It was not the rhetoric that was inconsistent; the rhetoric only becomes inconsistent when compared with the political necessities. The resistance that Dulles had long wanted and had predicted came to pass. Yet Dulles and all his beliefs were threatened and helpless. He could not risk World War III over Hungary. Political urgencies and realities would not allow it. American inaction showed the sterility of the liberation theme.

C. Conclusion

Yet, even having admitted that the rhetoric and the politics were often at odds with Dulles, it must still be argued that words, whether applied or unapplied, have their consequences so long as language operates in the proximity of action. The rhetoric, at least, influenced the politics, and, at most, influenced their reception by the appropriate audiences. Even a correct policy, C.L. Sulzberger reminds us, that is wrongfully presented, can suffer.[42] Style, after all, is the man himself and a policy creates an ethos that can never be divorced from the author of the policy. The consequences of the missionary theme, then, may serve as its assessment, but a preliminary question needs an answer.

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[41] Taylor, p. 18-19

[42] C.L. Sulzberger, What's Wrong With U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, 1959), p. 22.

Does a man use moral argument to justify his beliefs or do the beliefs justify the use of moral arguments? The difference between the two, though subtle, is crucial to our understanding of Dulles and his rhetorical posture.

Consider the first part of the question: Does a man use moral arguments to justify his beliefs? The answer is obviously affirmative and deeply rooted in American tradition. The use of a moral argument is an American topos, not exclusively American, but characteristically American. We justified our revolution through moral argument and have used the same strategy--for all of our wars. In the nineteenth century, both slaveholder and abolitionist justified their claims through moral sanction and some of the same arguments are used today on both sides of the Black revolution. It is well known, as another example, that if one is going to argue for or against the death penalty, the Bible is the best weapon. American speakers, in short, have always used moral arguments to justify their beliefs.

But consider the second part of the question: Do the beliefs themselves justify the use of moral arguments? The answer to that question is less rarely in the affirmative and an illustration will explain.

Suppose a Secretary of State views his job as executor and preserver of American foreign interests, no more and no less. Suppose, next, that a Latin American nationalist leader manages to overthrow his government and installs himself as leader. Several suspected communists are part of his government. The Secretary of

State, while not personally concerned about the nature of the revolution, views the whole affair as a threat to American interests. He suggests to the President an invasion as the most expedient response. The invasion is underway and the Secretary of State addresses the American people and attempts to justify the intervention. He surveys the "available means of persuasion" and includes in his repertoire a barrage of moral arguments. Communists are godless people; materialistic; they want to force their evil creed on us; better dead than red; the "good" people in the nation asked our help; we have an obligation to help people who want to be free; examine our own Declaration of Independence. In short, he selects his arguments because they work; they justify his action. The moral justification, in addition to being successful, can mask the real reasons for the invasion, all of which are political, but perhaps less persuasive or less understandable to the mainstream of American thought. To summarize, then, the speaker was successful because he used moral arguments to justify his case.

However, if the Secretary of State really believed those moral arguments and believed them so intensely that they influenced every aspect of his life, including his role as Secretary of State, then the converse can be true and the beliefs can justify the use of moral arguments and together they can serve as an <u>explanation</u> of the action in addition to the justification.

When we ask the question of Dulles whether he used moral arguments to justify his beliefs or whether his beliefs justified his moral arguments, the answer to both questions is affirmative.

Unlike most politicians, his beliefs and arguments could rarely be separated. They were the same and subsequently their use was as much doctrinal as rhetorical. This fact justified his constant use of the sermon. In October of 1958, William D. Clark interviewed Dulles over the Independent Television Network of the United Kingdom and asked the Secretary whether the struggle with communism was primarily a moral or political struggle. His answer was revealing:

> Primarily a moral struggle. Because if it was only power politics and did not involve a basic threat to the whole moral value of our civilization, we couldn't treat it as a worldwide struggle. The question of which regime exercises power here and there is of itself unimportant in many parts of the world, as far as we are concerned. It is only because that power is becoming a challenge to the basic moral principles of our Judeo-Christian civilization, and indeed the civilization which is based upon other great religions--it is only because of that that it becomes a world-wide struggle and a struggle where we must all stand together.[43]

That, then, was his rhetorical posture which found its expression through the missionary theme. Even when not directly relevant to his politics, it influenced his perceptions and hence his actions.[44] He came to be associated with a certain posture which influenced what he could say and what he did say. As we shall see next, his rhetoric contained four characteristics that in combination revealed his ideology and gave his language some political and rhetorical problems.

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[43]"Secretary Dulles Discusses U.S. Foreign Policy for British Television Broadcast," Department of State Bulletin. November 10, 1958, p. 733.

[44]For an excellent analysis, see Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," Journal of International Affairs. January, 1967, p. 16-39.

IV. RHETORIC AND IDEOLOGY

The rhetoric of John Foster Dulles was largely a rhetoric of ideology. It was not merely his use of the missionary theme that made him an ideologue, but rather his use of and belief in the missionary theme. This unusual combination gave his rhetoric a distinctive quality that influenced his style, that is, his word-choice and general use of language. The Economist, reflecting on Dulles' resignation in 1959, wrote that his "Christian vocabulary helped to convey a superficial impression of austerity amounting almost to fanaticism."[1] We have already seen enough of his rhetoric to focus upon four intermingling characteristics.

A. Moral Certainty

Dulles' use of language displayed a moral certainty about the correctness of his own position that bordered on self-righteousness. The texture of the following three sentences might well have been uttered by a George Whitefield or a Billy Graham:

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[1] The Economist, April 18, 1959, p. 207.

> As our national faith thus grows and is made manifest by works, its influence will be contageous throughout the world. As the evil faiths that combat us collapse, leaving death and ruin as their fruit, the faith that makes us strong will encompass the earth. It will unite men, as never before, in common and constructive purpose.[2]

His belief in the missionary theme was unwavering. He identified evil and truth and set his own battlelines. William Lee Miller wrote that "when you've got it arranged that way, you can talk tough and be moral at the same time."[3] But Miller also indicates the defect in such a characteristic. Such moral certainty clouds the view of the beholder, leaves him unbending and absolutistic. Without a degree of relativity, Miller suggests, "the American moralist can end up talking a language no one else in the world understands."[4] Drummond and Coblentz relate how Mme. Pandit of India once payed a high linguistic compliment to an American official by suggesting: "I can talk easily and frankly with you, but when your Secretary of State and I are discussing matters, God always gets between us."[5]

Because Dulles had that rare ability to see himself as the referee in a world of complex problems, his lecture on moral certainty extended to all who disagreed with him. His sermons were aimed not only at the communist world, but to his fellow Americans and to his staunchest allies.

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[2] Henry P. Van Dusen, ed., The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles (Philadelphia, 1959), p. 99-100.

[3] William Lee Miller, "The 'Moral Force' Behind Dulles's Diplomacy," The Reporter. August 9, 1956, p. 19.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Quoted in Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel At The Brink (New York, 1960), p. 77.

Consider this speech, given before the American Political Science Association, wherein Dulles lectures his audience on the defects of social legislation:

> If the solution for agriculture is for government to buy at fixed prices from farmers and to sell to consumers at subsidized prices, then why should the farming communities of the world turn to us for leadership? We are late starters in that direction. Soviet Russia has been operating for many years on principles found in what we now call the "Brannan Plan."
>
> If health care is best to be found by having government employ doctors and nurses and allocate them to needy persons, then why should those in the world who want better medical care look to the United States for guidance? Socialized medicine already exists and has existed for many years in Soviet Russia and elsewhere.
>
> If education ought to be financed and controlled by a central authority, then why should the peoples of the world look to the United States for guidance? That is the regular practice in totalitarian countries.
>
> If people should work in accordance with their ability and deliver the fruits of their labor to the central government to be used by it to promote the social welfare, then why look to the United States for guidance? For a generation that has been the operating program of the Communist Party in Russia.[6]

It is difficult to preserve scholarly objectivity while commenting on such statements. How double difficult it must have been then for those who did not share his moral certainty. Here was one of the highest paid lawyers in the country, financially comfortable his entire life, opposing social legislation only because similar programs existed in the Communist world. His moral certainty negated the need for systematic refutation. Self-righteousness serves as a substitute for argument.

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[6] John Foster Dulles, "The Blessings of Liberty," Vital Speeches. February 1, 1950, p. 235.

Yet if self-righteousness is considered too strong a word, consider these three references by Dulles to United States allies.

First, Dulles talks of American responsibility to help in the rebuilding of Europe:

> Today we are helping to finance the reconstruction of Western Europe. We cannot avoid responsibility for the result. The prewar structure was a structure that repeatedly had burst out into flames. The human and material losses over the years have been colossal and irreparable. After each past conflagration, the structure has been rebuilt substantially as before. Shall we make ourselves responsible for repeating that folly?
>
> If a banker were asked to lend the money for rebuilding a tenement house which had proved a ghastly fire hazard, and which had burned down several times with terrible loss of life, he would, I think, refuse unless modern fire preventives were introduced. He would be morally condemned if he put up the money to finance rebuilding a proven firetrap. That is what the United States will be doing unless we incorporate in our present program of aid to Western Europe features which will induce the Western European peoples to rebuild in a form that will realize their vast potentiality for peace and welfare.[7]

Secondly, Dulles writes of England's former days of glory and attempts to explain her current interest in socialism:

> This ship of state called "England" was manned by officers and crew who were hard-working, courageous, resourceful, inventive, and venturesome. They had set full sail in a turbulent sea.
>
> Now, however, all is changed. The captain and crew often act as though they were in charge of a derelict drifting to no discernible haven, with no dependable means of propulsion and only limited supplies of food and water.
>
> Under such circumstances "socialism" is natural. When men, women, and children are adrift they usually divide the food and water on an equal basis.[8]

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[7] John Foster Dulles, War Or Peace (New York, 1950), p. 217.

[8] Ibid., p. 159.

Finally, Dulles condemns the economic planning that Western Europe was currently undertaking to rebuild her economy:

> Socialization and "planning" demand insulation. The movement in that direction has not yet gone so far that it prohibits a beginning of unity. However, the trend is one which, as it goes on, makes it more and more difficult for governments to take part in a larger, freer society.
>
> The longer people live in hothouse conditions, the more reluctant they are to open the windows. They seal the windows until, some day, someone outside smashes them or inside pressures blow them out. We do not want to delay until that has to happen.[9]

The above references would have to be considered insensitive to anyone save those who shared Dulles' stance. His references to Europe as "a proven firetrap" and "a ghastly fire hazard" and to the United States as "a banker" are symptomatic of his view of American superiority. "When men, women, and children are adrift they usually divide the food and water on an equal basis" is an insulting analogy for England. Yet it is characteristic of the ideologue to ignore his audience and to one whose rhetoric is characterized by moral certainty such pronouncements would appear perfectly natural.

B. Vigor

Secondly, Dulles' rhetoric contained a quality of power or vigor that influenced his word choice and contributed vastly to the vocabulary of the cold war. "Brinksmanship" and "massive retaliation" are two such

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[9] Ibid., p. 220.

phrases still associated with the Dulles era. Both phrases denote the ideology of a man who was certain, unafraid and audacious.

"Brinksmanship" became associated with Dulles through an interview with James Shepley of Time-Life.[10] Deterrence as a military strategy was necessary, thought Dulles, to prevent both the big wars and little wars. Such a strategy involved a risk that Dulles was willing to take. Dulles told Shepley:

> You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war. Of course we were brought to the verge of war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost. We've had to look it square in the face--on the question of enlarging the Korean war, on the question of getting into the Indochina war, on the question of Formosa. We walked to the brink and we looked it in the face. We took strong action.[11]

Thus "brinksmanship" was coined. The Life article brought down upon Dulles some of the bitterest criticism he was to receive. Both Herman Finer and Drummond and Coblentz described how, when Anthony Eden read the article, he went into a rage, exclaiming, "That terrible man, that terrible man."[12] Dulles felt obliged to defend the concept, but he never wavered in its defense.[13]

"Massive retaliation" was closely linked with "brinksmanship" and together they describe the power that Dulles held during the fifties.

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[10] James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life. January 16, 1956, pp. 70-79.

[11] Ibid., p. 78.

[12] See Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez (Chicago, 1964), pp. 87-88 and Drummond and Coblentz, p. 162.

[13] See especially his news conference of January 11, 1956. Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1956, pp. 122-123.

Early in 1954, while addressing the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, he introduced the phrase that was to remain with him throughout his era:

> Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him. Otherwise, for example, a potential aggressor, who is glutted with manpower, might be tempted to attack in confidence that resistance would be confined to manpower. He might be tempted to attack in places where his superiority was decisive.[14]

Dulles, of course, profoundly believed that power was America's most important offensive ingredient. He referred to it as "the key to success in dealing with the Soviet leadership."[15] Yet power was also a characteristic of his rhetoric when dealing with friend or foe. "Agonizing reappraisal," "liberation," "rollback," "immoral and short-sighted conception," also display this same quality of power and vigor in word choice.[16] Seen in light of his belief in American superiority,

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[14] John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin, January 25, 1954, p. 108.

[15] Dulles, War or Peace, p. 16.

[16] This recalls the joint statement with Cordell Hull after the famous Hull-Dulles meeting at Dumbarton Oaks. After the two men agreed on the need for a United Nations, the principle source of friction was whether the statement should be labelled non-partisan or bi-partisan. Dulles held out for a short period, but eventually gave in and agreed to the word non-partisan. See also Emmet John Hughes. The Ordeal of Power (New York, 1963), pp. 86-88. Hughes describes the internal strife in the Eisenhower administration over the word "repudiation" in describing the administration's policies regarding so-called secret agreements that yielded Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. Dulles also lost this rhetorical battle.

both moral and political, these phrases can be appreciated and understood. For those who held, and still hold, his notion of mission, the language is acceptable. Those whose ideologies differed found his language distasteful and to a large degree frightening.

C. Exaggeration

Dulles' ideological rhetoric contained an exaggerative quality that usually resulted in oversimplification, but at times bordered on duplicity. Statements such as "There is no middle ground between freedom and slavery"[17] or "For their beliefs and ours, it is impossible to find a common denominator"[18] or "Basically, the present conflict between freedom and slavery is a conflict between a spiritual and material view of the Universe and of the nature of man"[19] are all oversimplifications capable of offending the intellectual and delighting the true believer. They are homilies, the sorts of phrases that get wild applause at political conventions and make their dent on history through Bartlett's Familiar Quotations. Such phrases were characteristic of Dulles in articulation of the missionary theme.

Yet this quality of exaggeration becomes more serious when we realize that, to Dulles, they were not oversimplifications. They formed a basic part of his belief system that allowed him an almost dangerous

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[17] John Foster Dulles, "Report on Berlin," Department of State Bulletin, March 9, 1954, p. 343.

[18] Dulles, War or Peace, p. 187.

[19] John Foster Dulles, "The Challenge to Freedom," Department of State Bulletin, May 24, 1954, p. 780.

rhetorical latitude. "Soviet Communism," he said, "starts from an atheistic, Godless premise. Everything else flows from that premise."[20] And indeed, to Dulles, all else did flow from that premise, even the simple act of observation. Consider this reference by Dulles to the facial expressions of the Russian leaders:

> In Moscow in 1947, I met all but two of the members of the Politburo at a dinner given by Marshal Stalin at the Kremlin. As I sat and looked upon their faces, I got an impression of tremendous controlled power. They showed the toughness of men who lived dangerously, and who had survived because, so far, they had killed before being killed. They showed the fanaticism of men who sense that they have a new formula which identifies the general welfare of the world with their own despotic power. They showed the quality of cold calculation which has made the Russians the world's greatest chess players. They showed a sense of unhurriedness which goes with belief that their task is not one of a year, not one of their own lifetime, but, as Stalin put it, one of an "entire historical era," and that "tactics of retreat" are as important as "tactics of advance."[21]

While perhaps Dulles had uncanny powers of observation, his description is utterly fantastic. Just as logical an observation of their "controlled looks" might be that they were frightened of Dulles or possibly bored with him. But this totally unimportant paragraph from War or Peace is important because it is so revealing of Dulles' beliefs, and the subtle areas where these beliefs found themselves.

Yet oversimplification was not the only aspect of Dulles' exaggerative abilities. His good-evil view of the world allowed him

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[20] Dulles, War or Peace, p. 8

[21] Ibid., p. 251-252.

to ignore the need for evidence in circumstances where a lack of evidence made the statements questionable in their regard for truth. Two small examples, not untypical, may illustrate the point.

During the course of some exposition regarding the merits of the United Nations, Dulles speaks of the organization's ability to expose hypocrisy. Then he refers to the Soviet Union:

> One of the most potent Soviet Communist weapons is propaganda that is devised to appeal to the listener without regard to whether it corresponds to the truth. Propaganda is the most important single weapon in the arsenal of Soviet Communism. I suppose that the Soviet government spends more money and effort on propaganda than all the other governments of the world put together.[22]

While propaganda is certainly important to the Soviet Union (and all countries, for that matter) Dulles' final sentence is a pretentious one. It assumes a knowledge of not only the Soviets' propaganda budget, but also the budget of all the countries of the world put together. It is doubtful that Dulles had or could have had such information, yet without such information, Dulles' statement is an exaggeration and he is misleading his readers.

The second example shows again an attempt to mislead his readers. He draws the distinction between the state and the party in the Soviet Union. He suggests that the distinction is crucial, since only 3% of the population belong to the Communist party. Then, he takes comfort in the fact that well over 90% of the population are not Communists and that the Russian army is not Communist. Finally, this:

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[22] Ibid., pp. 66-67.

> In total war, the Communist Party would have to depend upon an army and upon people who are themselves only to a small extent Communist, and who do not at all share the fanatical beliefs and global ambitions of the members of the Communist Party. Russian troops prefer to stay at home.[23]

Dulles is here indulging in either wishful thinking or deliberate duplicity. His fallacies are so obvious they need not be pointed out. More important is the liberty he allows himself to take. An ideologue defines his own truth and each corollary fits into the frame. While to those outside the frame, this example and the others may seem exaggerations or even misrepresentations, they no doubt to Dulles were true and accurate statements. Thus to faithful followers of Dulles, which meant the American people, they were also true and accurate statements. Such is the power of the ideologue.

D. Ambiguity

After describing the moral certainty, vigor and exaggeration in the rhetoric of Dulles, it may well seem contradictory to attach the label of ambiguity to his style. Ambiguity, however, was a quality of his rhetoric only because language operates in the same arena as action. A message can be clearly stated, yet its intention remains unclear. William Lee Miller describes it well:

> On reading his speeches one is struck by the quality of many of them. His thought is clearer and more sophisticated, his language more varied and precise than that of most of his colleagues--certainly than that of his chief. But President

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[23] Ibid., p. 115.

> Eisenhower manages, despite his trouble with language, to make his larger meaning come through; Mr. Dulles manages, despite his greater facility with language, to keep his larger meaning obscure. With Mr. Eisenhower the words are fuzzy but the real intention clear; with Mr. Dulles the words are clear but the real intention fuzzy.[24]

George Wallace's suggestion that he would clear the streets of crime sounds lucid enough. But the action he would take as a result of his promise remains vague, not to mention a bit frightening. Barry Goldwater's "extremism in defense of liberty is no vice" also sounds clear enough, but its real meaning remains ambiguous until it is applied to situations.

Dulles' rhetoric had a reputation for creating confusion about its intentions. What did brinksmanship really mean and how far on the brink was he willing to take his country? If containment was not good enough and liberation was, how far would America go in attempting to liberate Eastern Europe?[25] Or consider this morally certain, vigorous and exaggerative statement:

> Freedom never thrives in a conservatory. Freedom becomes a satisfying and contagious thing only as it is put to ennobling use. Your Government is acting in that faith. At all the critical points, we seek, with other friendly nations, to put freedom into action.[26]

The statement sounds good enough. It would probably receive applause, even if given today. But what does it mean when spoken in a

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[24] Miller, p. 17.

[25] Hughes, p. 156.

[26] John Foster Dulles, "The Moral Initiative," Department of State Bulletin. November 13, 1953, p. 744.

world of action? Either it means nothing or it has frightening implications. Few men in politics knew how they should react to Dulles. Herman Finer describes a conversation with one of Washington's most distinguished journalists. The journalist spoke of his friendships with foreign envoys and how he called them or they called him when mutual assistance was needed. The journalist told Finer:

> The most astounding and general reaction to anything Dulles said or did was always this: the embassies would call our office and anxiously ask, "What do you think he meant by what he said? What is there behind it? Does he really mean it?[27]

Thus Dulles' rhetoric of ideology was highly ambiguous.

E. Conclusion

Thus far we have seen the explication of the missionary theme, its relevance to the issues of neutrality and liberation, and have characterized his posture as an ideological one. What remains undone is the examination of selective policy actions to examine its flexibility and its results for American foreign policy.

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[27] Finer, p. 80.

V. RHETORIC AND FLEXIBILITY

One question remains about the rhetorical posture of John Foster Dulles. Did his posture limit his political flexibility, specifically when working with our allies and in dealing with the Soviet Union? In short, did his rhetoric influence his actions in a direct and indirect fashion, and would a less moralistic rhetoric have achieved more desirable results? The answers may serve as another assessment of the missionary theme.

The decade of the Fifties was an age of alliances in American foreign policy. Dulles supported the concept of an Atlantic Alliance and, by the time of his death, extended its principle of collective defense to almost fifty other nations, believing the concept of mutual security "a practical expression of that article of faith which declares that, though the people of the world be many, we are 'every one members of one another.'"[1]

Yet, ironically enough, leaders of the allied governments were often nearly as critical of Dulles as their common adversaries. Dulles, like many who hold a strong and righteous belief, rarely questioned

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[1]John Foster Dulles, "The Mutual Security Program: An Expression of Our Faith," Department of State Bulletin, July 7, 1958, p. 5.

the universal application of his notions to the peculiar political conditions that existed in other countries. He lacked, as Herman Finer, wrote, "the instinctive ability to enter into the feelings of others, to see the matter from their point of view."[2] French Foreign Minister Pineau relates that he often told Dulles he spoke the way he did because he was American. "I urged him," he said, "to try to imagine how he would talk on the same problem if he were, say, a Frenchman or some other nationality."[3] Such a deficiency is an unfortunate one, but tragically so for one who believed that "our foreign policy is not just a United States foreign policy; it becomes the foreign policy of many nations and many people."[4]

This lack of empathy irritated many, but none more than Sir Anthony Eden whose later encounters with Dulles during the Suez Crisis were to cost the British Prime Minister his position, health and possibly self-respect. British distrust of Dulles went as far back as the Forties when Herbert Morrison, one of Eden's predecessors in the Foreign Office, worked with Dulles on the Japanese Peace Treaty. The two men disagreed over which Chinese government Japan was to recognize. They

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[2]Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez (Chicago, 1964), p. 294.

[3]Quoted in Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel At The Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power (New York, 1960), p. 178.

[4]John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York), 1950, p. 181.

finally agreed that Japan could follow her own course of action. Herman Finer insists that the commitment was unmistakable.[5] Dulles, however, pressured Premier Yoshida into recognizing Chiang Kai-shek, and a bitter Morrison remarked that "I might be forgiven if I resolved there and then not fully to trust Dulles again."[6]

Eden did not forget the incident and discusses it in his Memoirs as "embarassing." Eisenhower relates how later Eden had asked the newly-elected President not to appoint Dulles his Secretary of State. Eisenhower comments in his own memoirs:

> Anthony Eden had then expressed the hope that I might appoint someone other than Dulles. From anyone else I would have resented such a suggestion as an unwarranted intrusion in America's affairs. But my long association and friendship with him during war and peace, involving the frankest kind of exchanges between us, made such a remark understandable. So, at that moment, I made no reply except to say that I knew of no other American so well qualified as Foster to take over the duties of that particular office.[7]

Only speculation would suggest what might have happened to Anglo-American relations if someone other than Dulles had been Secretary of State. Eden remarks how his relations with four earlier American Secretaries of State had been intimate and cordial and that rare misunderstandings were usually resolved: "My difficulty in working with Dulles," he wrote, "was to determine what he really meant and in consequence the significance to be attached to his words and actions."[8]

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[5] Finer, p. 84.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change (New York, 1963), p. 142.

[8] Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Boston, 1960), pp. 70-71.

The Geneva Conference on Indo-China showed this inability to cooperate and the following incident made for some of the strongest language Eden ever used, even when negotiating with the Soviets.

Dulles, a short time before the Conference was to open, called a meeting in Washington of the ambassadors from England, France and our Southeast Asian Allies. The purpose was to discuss security arrangements in Southeast Asia and, not uncommonly, Dulles did not inform the appropriate heads of state that he wished such a meeting. Sir Roger Makins, the British ambassador to the United States, wired Eden for instructions. Eden wired in return:

> Americans may think the time past when they need consider the feeling or difficulties of their allies. It is the conviction that this tendency becomes more pronounced every week that is creating mounting difficulties for anyone in this country who wants to maintain close Anglo-American relations. We, at least, have constantly to bear in mind all our Commonwealth partners, even if the United States does not like some of them; and I must ask you to keep close watch on this aspect of our affairs, and not hesitate to press it on the United States.[9]

Yet Eden was not alone in his resentment of Dulles' intrusion into internal political matters. Three incidents, all of a different nature, serve as illustration: the European Defense Community debates in France, the intervention in Guatemala and most important of all, the Suez Crisis.

A. European Defense Community

The European Defense Community was a French governmental proposal that would create a European Army to replace the national armies of the

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[9] Ibid., p. 110.

six nations of Western Continental Europe. The proposal was a delicate one. Germany, of course, supported the measure as did the Benelux countries. Italy was undecided. The French Assembly was bitterly divided. Some hated Germany too much to enter into such a defense arrangement; others feared the loss of national sovereignty; still others thought it ineffective without Britain; some simply thought there was no need. Dulles thought it a good measure since such a European force would not be "subject to national direction and not usable to serve national ambitions."[10] Of course, in addition, the European army would serve as a deterrent force to the ambitions of the Soviet Union.

With the French Assembly bitterly divided and a knowledge that the vote would be close, the French government decided to delay the final vote until the appropriate moment. Dulles, however, became impatient and suggested that if the plan were not passed, the occasion would call for an "agonizing reappraisal" by the American government. "Agonizing reappraisal" joined "brinksmanship," "neutrality," "rollback," "liberation," "massive retaliation," and the list of catch-phrases that angered his critics for their lack of clear meaning and intent. Dulles' full statement, given in late 1953 at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, said:

> If, however, the European Defense Community should not become effective, if France and Germany remain apart, so that they would again become potential enemies, then indeed there would

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[10] John Foster Dulles, "International Unity," Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1954, p. 937.

> be grave doubt whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonizing reappraisal of the basic United States policy.[11]

Dulles repeated his threat six months later before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The nature of the agonizing reappraisal became no clearer:

> It is obvious that the present situation cannot continue much longer. There exists a conjunction of circumstance which will not indefinitely persist and which when changed might make it impossible to achieve the vital goal of binding together those European nations whose past differences have led to wars of evergrowing intensity. We have made it clear to our European allies that failure to approve and implement EDC would necessitate a thorough re-examination of American policies. It cannot now be said what the results of that re-examination would be. It can, however, safely be predicted that it would necessitate some basic changes and that certain attitudes and policies on our part, which seem to be taken for granted by certain of our allies, would have to be reviewed.[12]

As a threat, the pressure was ineffective. French leaders, like all Europeans, knew the United States believed her own security tied to Europe's. Yet as an intrusion it was resented as "the method best guaranteed to destroy the chances of getting the supranational army through the then divided, instable, quibbling French parliament."[13]

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[11] Quoted in Hans J. Morgenthau, "John Foster Dulles," An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State In The Twentieth Century, ed. Norman Graebner (New York, 1961), p. 294.

[12] John Foster Dulles, "Maintaining Free World Unity," Department of State Bulletin. June 14, 1954, p. 922.

[13] Drummond and Coblentz, p. 86.

George Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, resented the interference: "That phrase of Foster's marked his anger. He had grounds to be angry, with France jumping from one foot to another. But what a thing to say to me, when I was doing everything conceivable to get the French parliament to ratify."[14]

After the French assembly defeated the European Defense Community, the nature of the agonizing reappraisal became clear. Like neutrality and liberation, it meant little and we accepted the presently existing NATO arrangements, with part of each nation's army allocated to joint defense arrangements. Somehow we had survived the crisis that a more flexible approach on Dulles' part might have avoided. The EDC was only one of several proposals that might have achieved the goal that Dulles thought necessary, yet the one he favored--the European Defense Community--was the chosen one, the reflection of desires, dire necessity and firm insistence. It need not have happened at all.

B. Guatemala

C. L. Sulzberger, who understood the resentment other nations had of Dulles' "diplomatic sermonizing," writes that "there is a sense in modesty. Let us no longer delude ourselves about how good we are." He quoted Dulles' suggestion that we ought not assume the right to meddle or be arbiter in other peoples' affairs. "True," says Sulzberger, "But what were we doing in Guatemala. . .?"[15]

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[14] Quoted in Ibid.

[15] C. L. Sulzberger, What's Wrong With U. S. Foreign Policy, (New York, 1959), p. 233-234.

In January 1953, Jacobo Arbenz was elected president of the Central American Republic of Guatemala. His predecessor, Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo, was unable to succeed himself under the Guatemalan constitution. In June, a revolution headed by Colonel Carlos Enrique Castillo Armas successfully overthrew the Arbenz government. The Armas revolutionaries invaded from Honduras. The above are the only facts in that six months period that are certain. The details which would prove or disprove the charge that the government was controlled by international communism are largely missing.[16]

It is curious that biographer Beal quotes Dulles as denying any part by the United States in supporting the Castillo forces.[17] Beal describes how Diego Rivera painted a symbolic mural in which the faces of both Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles appeared among those involved in the revolution. Then he describes how both brothers obtained reproductions as souvenirs, "perversely flattered by the imputation that they had the power to overturn a government and amused by the evil looks which Rivera had given their faces."[18]

President Eisenhower, however, did not disclaim the air support given the revolutionary forces by the United States:

> The air support enjoyed by Castillo Armas, though meager, was important in relative terms; it gave the regular armed forces an excuse to take action in their own hands to throw out Arbenz. The rest of Latin America was not in the least displeased.[19]

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[16] See especially H. Bradford Westerfield, The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy (New York, 1963), pp. 422-442.

[17] John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles: A Biography (New York, 1957), p. 235.

[18] Ibid., pp. 235-236.

[19] Eisenhower, p. 426.

Seyom Brown claims the intervention strategy was so successful that the United States now saw no need for a re-assessment of our approach to militancy in the hemisphere. The Guatemala affair convinced us that we had adequate power to handle insurgencies, claims Brown, "if only we would follow the example shown by Dulles in the Guatemalan affair, and unsqueamishly, do what was required."[20]

Eisenhower's analysis of Arbenz gives three pieces of evidence to establish the claim that the government was communist:

First, even though Arbenz denied he was a communist, it was "a denial that was issued in a speech at a May Day celebration featuring seventy thousand marchers."[21]

Second, that by the middle of October 1953, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs, John Moors Cabot, said publicly that Guatemala was "openly playing the Communist game."[22]

Third, that as an example, Guatemala accepted "the ridiculous Communist contention that the United States had conducted bacteriological warfare in Korea."[23]

Beal goes an additional step in describing an arms shipment that was sent from Poland to Guatemala, carrying "15,424 cases containing rifles, machine guns, artillery, and miscellaneous military equipment."[24]

Dulles held an interesting news conference on May 25 in which he revealed three facts: that Guatemala was the only American State which

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[20] Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power (New York, 1968), p. 141.

[21] Eisenhower, p. 422.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Beal, p. 234.

had not completely ratified the Rio Pact; that Guatemala was the only country in the Americas which voted against a resolution at Caracas that any base of international communism in the Americas would be a threat to the sovereignty of the Americas; and that Gautemala received a shipment of arms from behind the iron curtain.[25]

"By this arms shipment," Dulles said, "a government in which Communist influence is very strong has come into a position to dominate militarily the Central American area."[26]

The resolution at Caracas was introduced by Dulles, making ironically clear in language what he later disproved by action:

> What I suggest does not involve any interference in the internal affairs of any American Republic. There is ample room for natural differences between the political institutions of the different American states. But there is no place here for political institutions which serve alien masters. I hope we can agree to make that clear.[27]

The Rio Pact Nations did make it clear by a 17-1 vote. Guatemala voted against the resolution and two nations abstained. Even Beal admits the United States "had to do some diplomatic arm-twisting among some of the Latin states."[28] Guatemalan Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello angered Dulles during the debate by asking him what international communism was supposed to mean.

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[25] John Foster Dulles, "Communist Influence In Guatemala," Department of State Bulletin. June 7, 1954, p. 873.

[26] Ibid., p. 874.

[27] John Foster Dulles, "The Spirit of Inter-American Unity," Department of State Bulletin. March 15, 1954, p. 380.

[28] Beal, p. 233.

Dulles answered "in terms sharper than diplomats normally use:"[29] "It is disturbing if the foreign affairs of one of our American republics are conducted by one so innocent that he has to ask that question," Dulles replied. "But since the question has been asked, it shall be answered." Dulles then proceeded to inform the foreign ministers about the doctrine, aggression and political force of international communism as centered in the Soviet Union.[30]

Then came the invasion, the American air support and end of the Arbenz regime. Dulles, as though to reaffirm the American action, told a national television and radio audience, that if the communists were to capture any nation in this hemisphere, no matter how small, "a new and perilous front is established which will increase the danger to the entire free world and require even greater sacrifices from the American people."[31]

The incident in Guatemala was a relatively minor one in Dulles' career. Yet it is important in any assessment of the Secretary because it shows both the rhetoric, its relevance to action and its defects all at the same time. It shows, as Max Lerner suggested, that "the crucial trouble with Dulles' world is that he tries to be both a churchman relying on spiritual values and a power-politician relying on an overwhelming balance of force."[32]

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[29] Ibid., p. 232.

[30] John Foster Dulles, "Intervention of International Communism In Americas," Department of State Bulletin, March 22, 1954, p. 419.

[31] John Foster Dulles, International Communism In Guatemala," Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1954, p. 43.

[32] Max Lerner, "The World of John Foster Dulles," The New Republic, September 15, 1960, p. 18.

At Caracas, the same time he promised the Latin Americans that the U. S. would not intervene in their affairs, he lectured the ministers on brotherly love and America's belief in the spiritual principles:

> It has been my experience that the Governments of the American Republics usually act alike internationally because their peoples believe in the same fundamentals.
>
> We believe in a spiritual world; we believe that man has his origin and destiny in God; we believe that this fact requires human brotherhood.
>
> We believe that, just as every human being has dignity and worth, so every nation great or small has dignity and worth and that international relations should be on the basis of mutual respect and equal dignity.
>
> We believe that nations, like men, are subject to moral law and that in the international field the task is to develop international law and to conduct international affairs in accordance with the standards of moral law.
>
> That is the conception of my Government. I believe that it is a conception which the nations here generally share. Of course we are all fallible.[33]

Yet in Guatemala, Dulles showed the consequences for the Americas when one of the fold decides it did not want to act like all the rest and intervention was the direct result. Dulles saw no contradiction, probably not even a broken promise. He was, as usual, able to reconcile it in his own mind. As early as 1929, his thesis on the subject was this: "I suppose that it is inevitable that nations interfere with each other and influence each other. If so, I submit, there may well be situations where intervention by military force is the most humane procedure."[34]

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[33] John Foster Dulles, "The Spirit of Inter-American Unity," Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1954, p. 382.

[34] John Foster Dulles, "Conceptions and Misconceptions Regarding Intervention." Annals of the American Academy, July 1929, pp. 103-104.

The more long-range results of our participation in the Guatemala affair are difficult to measure. Eisenhower claimed the "rest of Latin America was not in the least displeased."

C. Suez

It may at once be suggested that the Suez crisis was Dulles' most crucial blunder in dealing with America's allies. All that we have described earlier had their ill effects, but none could compare with the ills that resulted with America's European alliance at the conclusion of that crisis. The scars were long in healing and, in some cases, they are still far from recovery. Herbert Finer, whose study of Dulles' role in the Suez crisis, despite his biases which are easily recognizable, gives a good analysis of some of the long-range results:

> At Nassau, in late December, 1962, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan impressed John F. Kennedy with the plea that Britain must have her own nuclear weapon, Polaris, in her own control, to be used "where the British would be alone and would need this force." The specific reference of Macmillan and Kennedy was to the Suez situation, in which the former suggested that the British had been isolated, and threatened with the bombardment of their island. "We hope," said President Kennedy, "the situation will not come again where they are isolated that way again. But I think they are conscious of that history." On January 14, 1963, De Gaulle reiterated his intention to build France's own atomic force, as America and Britain were doing, for purposes of the "supreme national interest." On September 23, 1963, the policy was specifically related to the French plight during the Suez crisis by Ambassador Herve' Alphand in a public speech in Chicago.[35]

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[35] Finer, p. 508.

Finer is somewhat unfair in assessing the blame due Dulles. Eden, despite whatever justifications he had for not trusting Dulles, must equally share some of the consequences. As Drummond and Coblentz point out, "the two men had no confidence in each other. As a result they were never frank with one another from start to finish of the crisis. This was to make the disaster possible."[36]

Yet, to a certain point, Eden was willing to cooperate, while Dulles was not. The crucial mistakes were made early in the crisis and Dulles deserves heavy responsibility for many of these.

While a complete analysis of the Suez crisis is beyond our scope, it is still necessary that several events in the situation be mentioned. The principal events were these:

> September 24, 1955: An arms deal between Moscow and Egypt is announced.
>
> December 19, 1955: The U. S. offers loans to Egypt to build Aswan High Dam. Britain and the World Bank are to join in the project.
>
> July 19, 1956: Dulles rescinds offer of Aswan Dam aid.
>
> July 26, 1956: Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal.
>
> August 16-23, 1956: The first London Conference of Maritime Powers, resulting in 18 power proposal for settlement of Suez dispute is held.

It is necessary to stop here and expand upon Dulles' role in the above events. This was the crucial period where Dulles' influence was paramount and where the crisis could possibly have been averted.

Why did Dulles cancel the project? Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, all U. S. allies, were bitterly opposed to the project; Congressional

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[36] Drummond and Coblentz, p. 169

opinion was not favorable; the Nasser strategy of playing off the U. S. and Russia was bitterly resented by Dulles. Beal describes Dulles' motive: "It was necessary to call Russia's hand in the game of economic competition. Dulles firmly believed the Soviet Union was not in a position to deliver effectively on all her economic propaganda offers. . . ."[37]

At an April 2, 1957 press conference, Dulles was asked why he cancelled the project. He suggested a number of reasons: Congressional opposition, the subject was too vast for the Egyptian economy; Egypt was moving closer to the Soviet-bloc countries; Egypt had recognized Communist China; and finally this response:

> That issue was, do nations which play both sides get better treatment than nations which are stalwart and work with us? That question was posed by the manner in which the Egyptians presented their final request to us, and stalwart allies were watching very carefully to see what the answer would be—stalwart allies which included some in the same area.
>
> Under all the circumstances, I think there was no doubt whatsoever as to the propriety of the answer given. It was given in a courteous manner, as you will find if you will go back and reread the statement which was given out at the time, which reaffirmed our friendship for the Egyptian people and indicated our willingness in other ways to try to assist the Egyptian economy.[38]

But, proper or not, it was primarily the method used by Dulles: an abrupt cancellation made without consulting the rest of the State Department, the President, the Cabinet or the National Security Council.[39] A cancellation made without consulting Britain or the World Bank who

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[37] Beal, p. 259.

[38] John Foster Dulles, "News Conference of April 2, 1957." Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1957, p. 642.

[39] Jules Davids, America and the World of Our Time (New York, 1960), p. 516.

co-sponsored the project; the indecision that made for rumors and world headlines; the abrupt announcement to Ambassador Hussein who had come to Washington to accept the American offer; the suggestion that the project was too large for the Egyptian economy. The announcement of the cancellation was made in such a manner that one unnamed American Ambassador was heard to suggest of Dulles: "He kicked them in the teeth with a missionary twist."[40]

Finer describes the situation in this manner:

> The truth seems to be that, on the spur of the moment, all the resentment of a man who had monumental self-righteousness, a reborn Calvinist who was a deeply committed lay pillar of the Christian church—all this boiled up and was visited on Nasser. Dulles did not play it long; he could not play it long; his feelings got the better of him. He could have said, "Let us wait!" He could have said, "Let us talk it over again in a couple of weeks time!" He might have replied: "I'm still thinking it over!" Instead of this, he said, "No!" In very brusque terms.[41]

The first criticism, then, was the method by which Dulles cancelled the loan; the second is ignoring the potential response by Nasser.

Several days before the cancellation, the French Ambassador to Washington, Couve de Murville, warned the State Department:

> To deny the loan for the Aswan Dam to Nasser is a very dangerous action; it can affect the Suez Canal. I know Nasser: as you know, I was Ambassador for my government in Cairo for several years. Beware how you handle the situation with the loan, because a most likely consequence of a refusal is the seizure of the Suez Canal![42]

On July 24, Nasser reacted in a speech to his countrymen. Finer suggests that eyewitnesses told him Nasser spoke with an intense and sus-

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[40] Finer, p. 462.

[41] Ibid., p. 51.

[42] Quoted in Finer, p. 47.

tained anger and fury "as almost to produce a bursting of his blood vessels."[43] He particularly resented Dulles' suggestions of the state of the Egyptian economy:

> If an uproar in Washington creates false and misleading announcements, without shame and with disregard for the principles of international relations, that the Egyptian economy is unsound and throwing shadows of doubt on Egypt's economy, I look at the Americans and say, "May you choke to death on your fury!"[44]

So Nasser, two days later, seized and nationalized the canal. Dulles returned from South America and immediately set off for London to meet with Britain and France. The three principal powers agreed to call a London Conference of the maritime powers. Dulles returned to Washington to address the American people on radio and television. He told them of the recent events and how severe they were, of the need for action and of the recent decision to call the London Conference. President Eisenhower shared the platform, and discussing possible moves if the conference failed, Dulles said:

> Mr. President, you and I have often talked about our Declaration of Independence and the principles that are set forth in that great document. And one of those principles is that to which the founders pledged themselves—that they would pay a decent respect for the opinions of mankind.
>
> I believe, Mr. President, that most people pay decent respect for the opinions of mankind when these are soberly, carefully, and deliberately formulated. And because I believe that, I am confident that out of this conference there will come a judgment of such moral force that we can be confident that the Suez Canal will go on, as it has for the last 100 years, for the years in the future to serve in peace the interests of mankind.[45]

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[43] Ibid., p. 56

[44] Quoted in Ibid.

[45] John Foster Dulles, "Report on the Suez Situation," Department of State Bulletin, August 13, 1956, p. 261.

The heart of the matter became this: Britain and France saw the Suez as their highest national priority at the moment. They could not survive without the Suez Canal. America had other oil resources and, at worst, the seizure was an inconvenience. The American-British-French alliance was in jeopardy. Dulles, as usual, introduced the missionary theme. No one knew what it actually meant, least of all Britain and France. If moral pressure failed, what would be the result? No one knew, since Dulles said moral pressure would work.

Dulles controlled the London Conference and his resolution was adopted. The plan called for an international board to operate the Suez Canal with appropriate financial returns for Egypt. Eighteen nations agreed to the resolution and a five man committee headed by Prime Minister Robert Menzies of Australia was charged with the responsibility of meeting with Nasser and discussing the Conference's recommendations.

The situation was tense, but the tenseness was an asset. Nasser did not know how far the United States would go in her dissatisfaction over the seizure. Most unfortunately, Dulles told a press conference:

> The United States is not dependent to any appreciable degree at all upon the Suez Canal. Its ships use the canal, but the United States economy is not dependent upon the canal. The economy of a number of other countries is vitally dependent upon the canal, and it is primarily for them to have an opinion as to what arrangements would in fact restore confidence so that their economies could go on being dependent upon the canal. As I say, that is not a matter which is primarily of United States concern but primarily of concern to the many countries about 20--whose economies are vitally dependent upon the canal. We did get the expression of views of most of those countries at the London conference, and those views are being presented to President Nasser within the next day or two.[46]

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[46] John Foster Dulles, "News Conference of August 28, 1956" Department of State Bulletin, September 10, 1956, p. 406.

Nasser rejected the recommendations of the London Conference. The next move was to establish a Canal Users Association which would provide qualified pilots for the users ships, receive the dues, pay compensation to Egypt, and arrange for the pattern of traffic using the canal. The situation was again delicate. For Egypt to resist would be a serious gamble, perhaps too serious for Nasser to risk. But Dulles was asked at a press conference what the U. S. response would be and he said:

> Well, if we cannot work out at the working level a program for getting ships through the canal on acceptable terms, and if physical force should be used to prevent passage, then obviously, as far as the United States is concerned, the alternative for us at least would be to send our vessels around the cape. Now, of course, that would involve inconvenience, cost, delays. But we have given a very careful study to that whole problem and we believe that it is solvable.[47]

It was announcing the next move at each step of the crisis that so irritated Britain and France that they eventually excluded Dulles and the United States from future action. Eden writes in his own memoirs:

> Thinking aloud about the next move is a dangerous practice. It almost inevitably destroys the chances of success for the present move. It is also a process which causes acute embarassment to friends. Often in these weeks we longed for the crisp "No comment," so firm an ally of American diplomacy in the past. Alas, it never came.
>
> This was not the first occasion upon which we had suffered from episodes of this kind. Already, while Mr. Menzies was on his way to Egypt, Mr. Dulles, in answer to a question from the press, had said that the canal was not of primary importance to the United States. No doubt he hoped thus to reassure American opinion; he also reassured Nasser.[48]

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[47] John Foster Dulles, "News Conference of September 13, 1956," Department of State Bulletin, September 24, 1956, p. 477.

[48] Eden, p. 524.

Pineau also shared these misgivings about Dulles' tactics:

> He sought to prevent us from taking action. He approached it juridically. He hoped little by little, over three or four months, to discourage the British and ourselves.
>
> I felt all along that he was holding back, but when we pushed him to be precise, he was never quite clear. He should have taken the bull by the horns at the very beginning and told us incontrovertibly no.
>
> At London, he proposed solutions such as the Canal Users Association, which did not involve force but which we thought at first would enable us to bring pressure to bear upon Nasser. But each time, as we got down to concrete talk of what Dulles' solutions would mean, he abandoned us as things progressed. He actually achieved precisely the opposite of what he sought. That is, he virtually obliged us to resort to force.[49]

Resort to force both France and Britain did, backing up Israel who had attacked Egypt by way of Sinai. Neither Dulles nor the United States were informed that such action was to occur. They had ignored America because they thought that America had ignored their vital interests. In all fairness to Dulles, his position was a delicate one. The nonaligned nations were watching with interest. America's allies expected greater empathy, if not direct assistance. It was the method and the language and the urge to comment when no comment would have been more appropriate. It was his sermon they resented, perhaps realizing the sensitivity of their own positions.

> Nations whose very existence has been at stake conceive of their self-defense more realistically than those who have so far been spared the horror. But it is the profession of a statesman to understand horrors without having experienced them. If he does not, he commits the errors that Dulles committed.[50]

If Dulles' purpose was to recognize and work with neutralistic nationalism, as Seyom Brown believes, then his plan failed:

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[49] Quoted in Drummond and Coblentz, pp. 177-178.

[50] Finer, p. 510.

> Rather than having United States restraint interpreted by the Arabs as the product of our respect for their desire to be fully independent our insistence that force not be used was being defined by the Nasserites and the Soviets as the product of our fear of a Middle Eastern confrontation with the Soviets.[51]

Enough has been seen of Dulles' role in the Suez crisis. Threatened by economic sanctions, Britain and France agreed to a cease fire. Eventually, Israel submitted to United Nations pressure and the crisis was over. Neither side gained much; Dulles perhaps lost the most. The Atlantic Alliance was torn apart and American prestige became a major issue in the 1960 presidential campaign. Congressional criticism was at its highest. His resignation was called for by the liberal press.

But Dulles never budged from his position. He was lawyer and juror and his address at the United Nations, urging a cease fire, demonstrates this. The war by Israel, Britain and France, he said, "cannot be treated as other than a grave error, inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the charter and one which if persisted in would gravely undermine our charter and undermine this organization."[52]

Considering his own activities in Guatemala and later Lebanon, considering that he personally was in part responsible for the whole crisis, and considering that an alliance was at stake, prudence would

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[51] Brown, p. 215.

[52] John Foster Dulles, "Statement by Secretary Dulles in the General Assembly, November 1, 1956," Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1956, p. 754.

have required a degree of silence of which Dulles was not capable. His rhetoric had aggravated the situation and it crippled the Atlantic Alliance.

D. Dealing With Communism

If his rhetoric hurt the Atlantic Alliance, it also managed to maintain the tensions of the cold war. Dulles' dealings with the Soviets were constantly and consistently dictated by his missionary theme. The most difficult question to answer is whether a stronger President or another Secretary of State might have achieved better results. We do know that Marshall Bulganin actually wrote Eisenhower a letter urging strongly for the dismissal of Dulles on the grounds "that nothing useful could be accomplished as long as he kept him."[53] We further know that only months after Dulles' death, tension had decreased to the extent that Nixon was able to visit the Soviet Union, Khruschev journeyed to America, and a limited test ban treaty was agreed to.

But the Dulles strategy was a fixed one, based upon his notion that communism was primarily a moral struggle contained in an atheistic creed. This is important, since Dulles, early in his career as Secretary announced:

> In international affairs it is important to know not only what another nation's position is, but why it takes that position. Positions taken merely out of a desire to be offensive require

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[53] Drummond and Coblentz, p. 12

> one type of reply, whereas positions taken as a logical consequence of doctrinal belief, call for a different type of reply.[54]

Communist positions, then, in Dulles' view, were taken as a result of doctrinal beliefs. It was the creed of the communists that, first of all, made his polarisation possible. As late as July 1958, Dulles continued to hold steadfastly to his view:

> The threat of international communism is far more formidable than if it represented merely aggressive ambitions. It also represents a creed with basic concepts about the world and the right and duty to use any means to impose these concepts upon the world. According to that creed, human beings are animated particles of matter; they should be brought into order and harmony by being made to conform to a master plan of worldwide scope; Soviet Communist leadership has the duty to do that and, if it succeeds, then there would be world peace, total harmony, and maximum productivity.
>
> This dedication to a materialistic, atheistic creed of world-wide application has been the moving force which has enabled a small group, who 41 years ago controlled nothing, now to control about a third of the world's population. No such development could have occurred except within the framework of a creed. The leaders of international communism make no attempt to disguise the fact that they have their articles of faith and that their policies stem from them.[55]

The view contrasted with his notion of American superiority. His rhetoric consistently forced a comparison.

> We on our part have our creed. We believe in God. We believe that each individual human being has his origin and destiny in God and on that account has a spiritual nature and personal dignity. We believe that all men are endowed by their Creator with rights of which they cannot be justly deprived by any

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[54] John Foster Dulles, "Reputation and Performance in World Affairs," Vital Speeches, May 15, 1949, p. 466.

[55] John Foster Dulles, "Mutual Security Program: An Expression of Our Faith," Department of State Bulletin, July 7, 1958, p. 5.

> government or group of men, however powerful. We believe that all men should have equal opportunity.[56]

This polarization was not the best method of reducing tensions and it irritated political men, here and abroad.

Nehru thought the notion of anti-communism versus communism perverse: "If Russia had been a great power, as it is today, without being a Communist power, the same conflict undoubtedly would exist."[57] He later told the same West German audience that polarization leaves no room for flexibility: "If carried to its final end, it divides the world into two hostile camps, each of which is ready to spring at the throat of the other."[58]

One of the more ironic criticisms of the polar view, and one that must have hurt Dulles a great deal, came from his own Presbyterian Church. In June of 1958, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church adopted this statement:

> A false and baneful doctrine is being persistently proclaimed, namely, that in the present world situation there are only two alternatives, either victory over the new Communistic powers, or the annihilation of the traditional democracies. There was a time when Christians and Moslems fervently held that one group or the other had to be totally vanquished by force. But eventually they learned to live in the same world. At a later period in history, Protestants and Roman Catholics thought that one side or the other had to be wiped out. But the time came when they, too, learned to coexist as they do today. So, while still striving

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[56] Ibid.

[57] J. Nehru, "Nehru Scores U. S. On Cold War," New York Times, July 15, 1956, p. 1:2.

[58] Ibid.

> for the freedom of all men, we today must coexist with Communist nations. In this nuclear age, the only alternative to coexistence is coextinction.[59]

But in addition to making polarization possible, the missionary theme limited Dulles' flexibility. It was a kind of mental inflexibility. It appeared at its worst when he once told his trusted aide Andrew Berding, who asked him to pose shaking hands with visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko for photographers, that he would not shake the hand of the visiting communist. When Berding convinced Dulles that such a refusal would be impolite, Dulles replied: "Well, I'll shake hands with him, but I don't have to smile." The result was in Berding's words, "The photo was taken and immediately published. There was no smile."[60]

But the inflexibility, taken more seriously, produced a type of meaninglessness to his negotiations. A 1957 exchange of letters between Dulles, Khrushchev and Lord Bertrand Russell illustrated this point well. Lord Russell initiated the exchange by printing an open letter to Khrushchev and Eisenhower. Russell argued that as the two most powerful men in the world, with "a power for good or evil exceeding anything ever possessed before by any man or group of men," Eisenhower and Khrushchev ought to recognize "that the matters in which the interests of Russia and America coincide are much more important than the matters

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[59] Quoted in Charles F. Edmundson, "The Lord and John Foster Dulles," Nation, September 13, 1958, p. 131.

[60] Andrew H. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (Princeton, 1965), p. 48.

in which they are thought to diverge."[61] Russell eloquently argued that the existence of the human race, the need to restrict diffusion of nuclear weapons, the fear of universal death as the only deterrent to war and the need to reduce the pale of fear could all serve as common ground for a personal meeting between the two world leaders.

Russell ended his tract in this fashion:

> The one thing necessary is that East and West should recognize their respective rights, admit that each must learn to live with the other and substitute argument for force in the attempt to spread their respective ideologies. It is not necessary that either side should abandon belief in its own creed. It is only necessary that it should abandon the attempt to spread its own creed by force of arms.[62]

The following week Khrushchev answered the letter. It was a mild response, basically agreeing with Russell and announcing his willingness to meet with Eisenhower to discuss the current threats to peace:

> We favour a meeting between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. It depends, therefore, on the leaders of the United States whether or not such a meeting will take place.[63]

The Soviet leader ends on this note:

> What we advocate is that the superiority of any particular system be proved, not on the field of battle, but in peaceful competition for progress, for improved living standards of the people.[64]

Three months later, Dulles "on behalf of the President," responded to both letters. He ignored the call for a meeting between the two leaders and instead largely devoted his reply to Khrushchev's agreement

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[61] Kingsley Martin, The Vital Letters of Russell Krushchev Dulles (London, 1958), p. 15.

[62] Ibid., p. 19.

[63] Ibid., p. 28.

[64] Ibid., p. 31

with Russell that neither side must change its creed:

> The creed of the United States is based on the tenets of moral law. That creed, as well as the universal conviction of the United States, rejects war, except in self-defense. This abhorrence of war, this determination to substitute peaceful negotiation for force in the settlement of international disputes, is solidly founded on the religious conviction that guided our forefathers in writing the documents that marked the birth of America's independence. Indeed, there are important elements in our religious groups who even decry the use of force for self-defence. I do not think that it is possible to find in the history of the United States any occasion when an effort has been made to spread its creed by force of arms. There is, therefore, no need on our side to 'abandon' what Lord Russell condemns. On the contrary, it would be abhorrent and unthinkable that there should be introduced into our creed the concept of its maintenance or extension by methods of violence and compulsion.[65]

Dulles ends his letter with this statement:

> I revert again to Lord Russell's statement that 'it is not necessary that either side should abandon belief in its own creed'. Certainly that is true of the United States, where creed comprehends the renunciation of force and violence to spread its creed. The same, unhappily, cannot be said of Soviet Communism, whose creed comprehends the use of force and violence. Therefore, I believe that it is necessary that at least that part of the Soviet Communist creed should be abandoned in order to achieve the peaceful result which is sought by Lord Russell and all other peace-loving people.[66]

The result of course was no meeting. It was not the first opportunity missed for a reduction in tension or at least an attempt at such a reduction. Dulles once told Mendes-France that "he did not believe in the possibility of sincere, constructive accords with Moscow

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[65] Ibid., p. 33.

[66] Ibid., p. 38.

as long as the Soviet government was motivated by the treacherous doctrines of Leninism."[67]

He once said, as related by Berding, that a Summit might reduce tensions and that such a possibility was not desirable. This statement speaks for itself:

> I'm concerned lest a summit meeting be nothing but a spectacle and promote a false euphoria. Under those circumstances we and our allies might not take the necessary steps to keep the free world together. If there's no evident menace from the Soviet bloc our will to maintain unity and strength may weaken. It's a fact, unfortunate though it be, that in promoting our programs in Congress we have to make evident the international communist menace. Otherwise such programs as the mutual security one would be decimated.[68]

It was this type of inflexibility that caused Nation as early as 1953 to stress that what Washington badly needed was "flexibility combined with a coherent, realistic picture of the world we intend to bargain for. That there is no such picture in the minds of the policy makers is evident."[69]

It was this type of inflexibility that upset William Lee Miller when he philosophized:

> The diplomatic moralizer has a weapon that those who argue policies on more rational grounds do not have; he can simply draw a line that excludes some possibilities as immoral. Maybe the policies Mr. Dulles doesn't like can be proved mistaken, but it ought to be necessary to prove it—instead of simply ruling them out from the unassailable pinnacle of "absolute right and wrong."[70]

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[67] Drummond and Coblentz, p. 133

[68] Berding, pp. 23-24.

[69] Freda Kirchwey, "Mr. Dulles's Balloon," Nation, April 18, 1953, p. 320.

[70] William Lee Miller, "The 'Moral Force' Behind Dulles's Diplomacy," The Reporter, August 9, 1956, p. 20.

It was this type of inflexibility that caused Richard Rovere to remark in his own sprightly style:

> If one tries to catch the rhythm of events in Washington, one observes that the periods in which our foreign policy, as it is laid down from on high, appears to reach the maximum of flexibility and sobriety are those periods when Mr. Dulles is out of the country and making the rounds of the chancelleries. Then it is the President who speaks and gives a powerful sense of being profoundly aware not only of the danger of Communist expansion but of the danger of war. After these interludes, Mr. Dulles flies in for a few days, delivers a couple of dour Calvinist forecasts of doom and retribution, then heads back out to Bangkok or Rio or wherever.[71]

It was this type of inflexibility that caused Nation as late as 1958 to editorialize:

> Mr. Dulles is seldom at a loss for words. If, instead of exuding self-righteousness and injury, he would hit back at the Soviets with some sensible, realistic proposals for a foreign ministers' conference, he might find himself, for once, getting a good world press. What is to stop him from spelling out the issues which the United States is willing to discuss?[72]

It was this type of inflexibility that caused Sidney E. Smith, Canada's Minister for External Affairs, to complain:

> I must say that I am greatly disturbed when we read of a proposal for a high-level conference and the next morning we read press reports from Washington quoting these spokesmen (official sources) to the effect that it is to be turned down.[73]

Late in his career, when Dulles was interviewed for British television, he was asked to reply to "the commonest form of their criticism,

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[71] Richard Rovere, Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years (New York, 1956), p. 267.

[72] "The Dulles Dilemma," Nation, March 15, 1958, p. 217.

[73] "The Case Against Mr. Dulles," Nation, December 14, 1957, p. 446.

which is that America is missing opportunities for improving peace or the chances of peace by your being too rigid."[74]

Dulles' reply was again a sermon, the restatement of right principles, the missionary theme:

> On this question of rigidity, I do believe that there are certain basic principles in which we believe and to which we must hold steadfastly. We are up against a creed which believes almost fanatically in a different concept of the nature of the world, the kind of a civilisation we should have and above all the nature of man and the part man plays in it. It should be just a mechanistic particle to be dealt with by government in the interests of material welfare.
>
> We have a totally different concept, always have had; and this struggle of man for freedom has been going on over the centuries, and we cannot conduct it successfully unless we believe in it and are steadfast and strong for it. Now in those basic things I admit to being rigid, to standing firm and standing solid.[75]

This was the same answer he had been giving since 1953. Much had happened in between, but he had not changed his mind. He relied on the usual, the vague, the meaningless. He relied on the answer that did not really answer, the sermon instead of political wisdom. If the rest of the world did not understand, that mattered little. He was doing his duty and that was the most important thing.

"I don't believe that this is preaching," he had said on an earlier occasion. "Stating the right principles over and over is the duty of every statesman. If these principles are followed the world will have lasting peace and peoples will cooperate to improve their common lot."[76]

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[74] "Secretary Dulles Discusses U. S. Foreign Policy for British Television Broadcast," Department of State Bulletin, November 10, 1958, p. 733.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Berding, p. 101.

That, then, was the missionary theme in the rhetoric of John Foster Dulles. As a strategy, it irritated, confused, and frustrated elements within the country and those outside it. Irritation, confusion and frustration were the end results of a vague posture which addressed itself to generalities and avoided too often the specifics. Because the posture became identified with the man and the man was identified as the government, it was relevant to all facets of American foreign policy during his seven years as Secretary of State.

As suggested earlier, only the foolish would predict the results of the same period with someone other than Dulles at the helm in America's foreign affairs. But, equally true, only the blind can deny the common ground that the two succeeding administrations found with the communist world, even though America did not sell its moral foundation and the Soviets did not revise their Leninist creed.

VI. CONCLUSION

This study of the missionary theme in the rhetoric of John Foster Dulles reveals several conclusions and implications.

A. Summary

First, there was a missionary theme that permeated the rhetoric of John Foster Dulles. The theme was a combination of several factors regarding America, Christianity and the rest of the world. He viewed America as a nation with a special heritage, composed of a desire for individual freedom, built on hard work and powerful initiative. He stressed America's heritage as a Christian nation with deeply-rooted foundations based on faith in a revealing God who gave us moral laws and specific duties and obligations. He believed that Christian America had a mission to arm itself in moral combat against Communism, an adversary Dulles believed atheistic, materialistic, controlled, and incontrovertibly entrenched in the creed of Lenin.

Secondly, the missionary theme was expressed through an ideological rhetoric. Dulles' use of language reflected moral certainty, vigor, exaggeration and ambiguity. The message had little regard for time, place and audience. The ideology was found in his speeches and

articles, at home and abroad and both early and late in his career as Secretary of State. The theme was constant and persistent, sincerely articulated and consistently utilized.

Thirdly, the missionary theme was resented to a large extent. Critics abroad thought it presumptive on his part to dictate his view as though it was the only one applicable to particular and peculiar situations. Some at home thought it diplomatic moralizing and preaching sermons when specific refutations or constructive alternatives would have been better received.

Fourthly, the missionary theme created a posture for Dulles that influenced his politics in a variety of direct and indirect fashions. Because the theme was vague enough to create confusion, no one was certain how it would apply in given cases. The issues of neutrality and liberation derived from this rhetorical posture, and it was only when political realities came into conflict with his rhetoric that the phrases were revealed as contentless. It was this posture that allowed him to interfere with the European Defense Community; intervene in Guatemala; and abruptly cancel the Aswan Dam project, creating a Mideast showdown that shook the Atlantic Alliance to its foundation. He saw himself, almost exclusively, as a moral prophet in the world of politics. Even when the theme was not directly relevant, the posture was there; the posture <u>was</u> Dulles and had a marked influence on his role as America's chief foreign affairs officer of the period.

Finally, the missionary theme limited his flexibility in dealing with the communist world. Communism was so evil that it was not capable of the slightest good; nor would it be capable until it renounced its origins. His strategy was, to a large extent, to wait out the communists

until their peoples revolted against the slaveholders and caused the disintegration that he fully expected. In the meantime, negotiations were futile so long as the Soviets professed their Leninistic tenets. The theme tended to create and maintain a polarization which served to intensify the cold war. Soviet policies were not refuted; areas of possible discussion were not constructed. Communists were simply morally condemned.

In addition to these results, the missionary theme had some added implications that need to be suggested.

B. Implications

The three general implications that follow are all concerned with the relationship between rhetoric and politics. None of the three have been given enough attention in rhetorical literature. The implications, as suggested here, refer only to Dulles, but additional thought and research could well extend their applicability to other public figures.

First, the effects of the missionary theme go beyond a specific audience. In a real sense, Dulles ignored his audiences. Far less than most speakers, he made only minute attempts to adjust his arguments to particular audiences. He did not change his arguments to suit the peculiar interests and beliefs of his listeners. Rather, one important effect of the missionary theme was on Dulles himself. His rhetoric was as much a handicap to Dulles as it was to American foreign policy. If a man limits his arguments according to his notions of what is morally right, he limits his choices. If his "ideological straight jacket"

does not work, he has no where else to go. When turning elsewhere is not possible, rigidity and inflexibility are the end results. If Dulles did not believe that negotiations with the Soviets were possible, what benefits could come from the negotiations that political circumstances forced upon him? Dulles, in short, was a prisoner of his own rhetoric.

Secondly, this analysis of the missionary theme questions the traditional distinction between rhetoric and dialectic. Antiquity tells us that dialectic is a method of investigation, a method of gaining knowledge; rhetoric is a method of dissemination, a form of communicating knowledge. With Dulles, however, the processes are largely the same. He did not choose his arguments, he related his beliefs. His beliefs and his arguments were largely identical and new knowledge only reinforced them. Whether or not this is unique to Dulles is a question that needs additional investigation. Dean Rusk or Lyndon Johnson would be interesting figures worthy of such an analysis.

Thirdly, this analysis demonstrates the danger of an unnatural rhetorical posture. That is, because of a weak President and an overly-strong Secretary of State, American foreign policy of the Fifties became centered around and associated with one man. This reaches a danger point in a democracy, not to mention the liabilities it creates for a nation's foreign policy. Even a good policy can suffer if articulated by the wrong man, and those who had no confidence in Dulles had no confidence in America. Britain and France went to war over the Suez without informing the United States because they had no confidence in John Foster Dulles. From a political point of view, if the Atlantic

Alliance was vital to American interests, its stability should not have been placed in the hands of a single individual.

C. Observations

While what follows can be called neither results nor implications, there are two general areas of observation that are suggested by this analysis.

First, the study raises a series of questions about the assumptions that Dulles made regarding America's foreign policy. John Foster Dulles combined Americanism with Christianity to much too great an extent, but he was neither the first nor last American to do so. Is it possible for America to be separated from its roots? Can America detach its political interests from its moral concerns? At what point does a nation come of age and realize that one country can differ from another in a thousand ways without losing its ability to get along with another country? We can almost forgive the platitudes that exist in the minds of many Americans, since it was their leaders, and to some extent events of a different age, that placed them there. But ought not we to expect more of our leaders? How much of the present U. S. foreign policy is still based on the notion that the rest of the world ought to conform to America's concept of virtue? Where do America's political interests end and where do her desires for manifest destiny begin? For the first time in American history, these questions are being asked by small but significant numbers of people. More optimistically, the questions are being raised not only in the university, but the congress and the market place as well. Their answers will have vast implications for America's

future. Social scientists are exploring them, and rhetoricians need to join in the concern.

Secondly, one feels called upon to assess Dulles' place in history. He will be remembered as a stubborn, confident and inflexible person who was sincere and never-tiring in his work; as the author of massive retaliation, brinksmanship, liberation, neutrality and agonizing reappraisal; as the most powerful Secretary of State in this century, possibly in all American history; as one of the most hated and most loved of his day; as one who quite possibly did not really understand the "nature of the Soviet menace;" finally, as a missionary in an era when nationalism made proselytizing unpalatable to most of the world.

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